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The notion of a behavioral elasticity occu-pies a critical place in the economic anal-
ysis of taxation. Graduate textbooks teach 
that the two central aspects of the public 
sector, optimal progressivity of the tax-and-
transfer system, as well as the optimal size of 
the public sector, depend (inversely) on the 
 compensated elasticity of labor supply with 
respect to the marginal tax rate. Indeed, until 
recently, the labor supply elasticity was the 
closest thing that public finance economics 
had to a central parameter. In a static model 
where people value only two commodities—
leisure and a composite consumption good—
the real wage in terms of the consumption 
good is the only relative price at issue. This 
real wage is equal to the amount of goods 
that can be consumed per hour of leisure 
foregone (or, equivalently, per hour of labor 
supplied). At the margin, substitution possi-
bilities, and therefore the excess burden of 
taxation, can be captured by a compensated 
labor supply elasticity.
With some notable exceptions, the profes-
sion has settled on a value for this elasticity 
close to zero for prime-age males, although 
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for married women the responsiveness of 
labor force participation appears to be sig-
nificant. Overall, though, the compensated 
elasticity of labor appears to be fairly small. 
In models with only a labor–leisure choice, 
this implies that the efficiency cost per dollar 
raised of taxing labor income—to redistrib-
ute revenue to others or to provide public 
goods—is bound to be low, as well.
Although evidence of a substantial com-
pensated labor supply elasticity has been 
hard to find, evidence that taxpayers respond 
to tax system changes more generally has 
decidedly not been hard to find. For exam-
ple, the timing of capital gains realizations 
appears to react strongly to changes in capi-
tal gains tax rates, as evidenced by the surge 
in capital gains realizations in 1986, after the 
United States announced increased tax rates 
on realizations beginning in 1987 (Auerbach 
1988). Dropping the top individual tax rate 
to below the corporate tax rate in the same 
act led to a significant shift in business activ-
ity toward pass-through entities, which are 
not subject to the corporate tax (Auerbach 
and Slemrod 1997).
Addressing these other margins of behav-
ioral response is crucial because, under some 
assumptions, all responses to taxation are 
symptomatic of deadweight loss. Taxes trig-
ger a host of behavioral responses intended 
to minimize the burden on the individual. In 
the absence of externalities or other market 
failure, and putting aside income effects, all 
such responses are sources of inefficiency, 
whether they take the form of reduced labor 
supply, increased charitable contributions 
or mortgage interest payments, increased 
expenditures for tax professionals, or a dif-
ferent form of business organization, and 
thus they add to the burden of taxes from 
society’s perspective. Because in principle 
the elasticity of taxable income (which we 
abbreviate from now on using the stan-
dard acronym ETI) can capture all of these 
responses, it holds the promise of more 
 accurately summarizing the marginal effi-
ciency cost of taxation than a narrower mea-
sure of taxpayer response such as the labor 
supply elasticity, and therefore is a worthy 
topic of investigation.
Although the literature reviewed in this 
article addresses the behavioral response 
to individual income taxation, many of the 
issues apply to any tax base. Certainly the idea 
that, under some assumptions, all responses 
are symptoms of inefficiency applies gener-
ally. For example, consider a state imposing 
a cigarette excise tax. Under some assump-
tions, the central empirical parameter is the 
elasticity of the cigarette tax base, which 
includes not only the response of smoking to 
tax rate changes but also the impact on the 
tax base of smuggling and tax-free Internet 
purchases.
The new focus (on the ETI) raises the 
possibility that the efficiency cost of taxa-
tion is significantly higher than is implied if 
labor supply is the sole, or principal, mar-
gin of behavioral response. Indeed, some 
of the first empirical estimates of the elas-
ticity of taxable income implied very sizable 
responses and therefore a very high marginal 
efficiency cost of funds. However, the subse-
quent literature found substantially smaller 
elasticities, and raised questions about both 
our ability to identify this key parameter and 
about the claim that it alone is a sufficient 
statistic for welfare analysis of the tax sys-
tem. Whether the taxable income elasticity 
is an accurate indicator of the revenue leak-
age due to behavioral response, the ultimate 
indicator of efficiency cost, depends on the 
situation. First, if revenue leakage in cur-
rent year tax revenue is substantially offset 
by revenue gain in other years or in other tax 
bases, it is misleading. Second, if some of the 
response involves changes in activities with 
externalities, such as charitable giving behav-
ior, then the elasticity is not a sufficient sta-
tistic for welfare analysis. Third, the elasticity 
depends on the tax system. A tax system with 
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a narrow base and many deductions and 
avoidance opportunities is likely to generate 
high elasticities and hence large efficiency 
costs. In that context, broadening the tax 
base and eliminating avoidance opportuni-
ties such as to reduce the elasticity is likely 
to be more efficient and more equitable than 
altering tax rates within the old system.
The remainder of the paper is organized 
as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework underlying the taxable income 
elasticity concept. Section 3 presents the key 
identification issues that arise in the empiri-
cal estimation of the taxable income elastic-
ity, using as an illustration the taxable income 
response to the 1993 top tax rate increase 
in the United States. Section 4 reviews the 
results of some selected empirical studies in 
light of our discussion of the conceptual and 
empirical issues. Section 5 concludes and 
discusses the most promising avenues for 
future research. Appendices present a sum-
mary of the key U.S. legislated tax changes 
that have been studied in the U.S. literature 




In the standard labor supply model, indi-
viduals maximize a utility function u(c, l) 
where c is disposable income, equal to con-
sumption in a one-period model, and l is 
labor supply measured by hours of work. 
Earnings are given by w · l, where w is the 
exogenous wage rate. The (linearized) bud-
get constraint is c = w · l · (1 − τ) + E, 
where τ is the marginal tax rate and E is vir-
tual income.
The taxable income elasticity literature 
generalizes this model by noting that hours 
of work are only one component of the 
behavioral response to income taxation. 
Individuals can respond to taxation through 
other  margins such as intensity of work, 
career choices, form and timing of com-
pensation, tax avoidance, or tax evasion. As 
a result, an individual’s wage rate w might 
depend on effort and respond to tax rates, 
and reported taxable income might differ 
from w · l as individuals split their gross 
earnings between taxable cash compensation 
and nontaxable compensation such as fringe 
benefits, or even fail to report their full tax-
able income because of tax evasion.
As shown by Feldstein (1999), a simple 
way to model all those behavioral responses 
is to posit that utility depends positively 
on disposable income (equal to consump-
tion) c and negatively on reported income z 
(because activities that generate income are 
costly, for example because they may require 
foregoing leisure). Hence, individuals choose 
(c, z) to maximize a utility function u(c, z) 
subject to a budget constraint of the form 
c = (1 − τ) · z + E. Such maximization 
generates an individual “reported income” 
supply function z(1 − τ, E) where z depends 
on the net-of-marginal-tax rate 1 − τ and 
virtual income E generated by the tax/trans-
fer system.1 Each individual has a particular 
reported income supply function reflecting 
his/her skills, taste for labor, opportunities 
for avoidance, and so on.2 
In most of what follows, we assume away 
income effects so that the income func-
tion z does not depend on E and depends 
1 This reported income supply function remains valid in 
the case of nonlinear tax schedules as c = (1 − τ)z + E is 
the linearized budget constraint at the utility-maximizing 
point, just as in the basic labor supply model.
2  We could have posited a more general model in 
which c = y − τ z + E, where y is real income and z is 
reported income that may differ from real income because 
of, for example, tax evasion and avoidance. Utility would 
be u(c, y, y − z) which is increasing in c, decreasing in y 
(earnings effort), and decreasing in y − z (costs of avoid-
ing or evading taxes). Such a utility function would still 
generate a reported income supply function of the form 
z(1 − τ, E) and our analysis would go through. We come 
back to such a more general model in section 2.4.
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only on the net-of-tax rate.3 In the absence 
of  compelling evidence about significant 
income effects in the case of overall reported 
income, it seems reasonable to consider the 
case with no income effects, which simpli-
fies considerably the presentation of effi-
ciency effects. It might seem unintuitive to 
assume away the effect of changes in exog-
enous income on (reported taxable) income. 
However, in the reported income context, E 
is defined exclusively as virtual income cre-
ated by the tax/transfer budget constraint 
and hence is not part of taxable income z. 
Another difference is that the labor compo-
nent of z is labor income (w · l) rather than 
labor hours (l); this difference requires us 
to address the incidence of tax rate changes 
(i.e., their effect on w), which we do briefly 
in section 2.2.5.
The ETI literature has attempted to esti-
mate the elasticity of reported incomes with 
respect to the net-of-tax rate, defined as 
(1) e =  1 − τ _z  ·  
∂ z _ 
∂ (1 − τ)
 , 
the percent change in reported income 
when the net-of-tax rate increases by 1 per-
cent. With no income effects, this elasticity is 
equal to both the compensated and uncom-
pensated elasticity. Importantly, and as rec-
ognized in the labor supply literature, the 
elasticity for a given individual may not be 
constant and depends on the tax system. As a 
result, an elasticity estimated around the cur-
rent tax system may not apply to a hypotheti-
cal large tax change. As shown in Feldstein 
3  There is no consensus in the labor supply literature 
about the size of income effects, with many studies obtain-
ing small income effects, but with several important studies 
finding large income effects (see Blundell and MaCurdy 
1999 for a survey). There is much less empirical evidence 
on the magnitude of income effects in the reported income 
literature. Gruber and Saez (2002) estimate both income 
and substitution effects in the case of reported incomes, 
and find small and insignificant income effects.
(1999), this elasticity captures not only the 
hours of work response, but also all other 
behavioral responses to marginal tax rates. 
Furthermore, it depends on features of the 
tax system, such as the availability of deduc-
tions, and other avoidance opportunities—a 
very important point for the interpretation 
of empirical results, as we discuss below. 
Therefore, the elasticity is not a structural 
parameter depending solely on individual 
preferences.
As we discuss later, a number of empiri-
cal studies have found that the behavioral 
response to changes in marginal tax rates 
is concentrated in the top of the income 
distribution, with less evidence of any 
response for the middle and upper-middle 
income class (see sections 3 and 4 below).4 
Moreover, in the United States, because of 
graduated rates as well as exemptions and 
low-income tax credits, individual income tax 
liabilities are very skewed: the top quintile 
(top percentile) tax filers remitted 86.3 per-
cent (39.1 percent) of all individual income 
taxes in 2006 (Congressional Budget Office 
2009). Therefore, it is useful to focus on the 
analysis of the effects of changing the mar-
ginal tax rate on the upper end of the income 
distribution. Let us therefore assume that 
incomes in the top bracket, above a given 
reported income threshold  
_
 z, face a constant 
marginal tax rate τ.5 
As in the conceptual framework just 
described, we assume that individual incomes 
reported in the top bracket depend on the 
net-of-tax rate 1 − τ. Let us assume that there 
are N individuals in the top bracket (above  
_
 z) 
4 The behavioral response at the low end of the income 
distribution is for the most part out of the scope of the pres-
ent paper. The large literature on responses to welfare and 
income transfer programs targeted toward low incomes 
has, however, displayed evidence of significant labor supply 
responses (see, e.g., Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001).
5 For example, in the case of tax year 2008 federal 
income tax law in the United States, taxable incomes above _
 z = $357,700 are taxed at the top marginal tax rate of 
τ = 0.35.
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when the top bracket rate is τ. We denote 
by  z m (1 − τ) the average income reported by 
those N top taxpayers, as a function of the 
net-of-tax rate. The aggregate elasticity of tax-
able income in the top bracket with respect 
to the net-of-tax rate is therefore defined 
as e = [(1 − τ)/ z m ] · [∂  z m /∂ (1 − τ)]. This 
aggregate elasticity is equal to the average of 
the individual elasticities weighted by indi-
vidual income, so that individuals contribute 
to the aggregate elasticity in proportion to 
their incomes.6 
Suppose that the government increases 
the top tax rate τ by a small amount d τ 
(with no change in the tax schedule for 
incomes below  
_
 z). This small tax reform has 
two effects on tax revenue. First, there is a 
“mechanical” increase in tax revenue due to 
the fact that taxpayers face a higher tax rate 
on their incomes above  
_
 z. The total mechani-
cal effect is 
(2) dM ≡ N · ( z m −  _ z) · d τ > 0. 
This mechanical effect is the projected 
increase in tax revenue, absent any behav-
ioral response.
Second, the increase in the tax rate triggers 
a behavioral response that reduces the aver-
age reported income of top N taxpayers by 
d  z m = −e ·  z m · dτ/(1 − τ).7 A change in 
reported income of d z m changes tax revenue 
by τ d  z m . Hence, the aggregate change in tax 
6 Formally,  z m = [ z 1 + . . +  z N ]/N and hence
e = [(1 − τ)/ z m ] · [∂  z m /∂ (1 − τ)]
 = (1 − τ) · [∂  z 1 /∂ (1 − τ) + . . + ∂  z N /∂ (1 − τ)]/[N ·  z m ]
 = [ e 1 ·  z 1 + . . +  e N ·  z N ]/[ z 1 + . . +  z N ],
where  e i is the elasticity of individual i.
7 The change d τ could induce a small fraction d N of the 
N taxpayers to leave (or join if d τ < 0) the top bracket. 
As long as behavioral responses take place only along the 
intensive margin, each individual response is proportional 
to d τ so that the total revenue effect of such responses is 
second order (d N · d τ) and hence can be ignored in our 
derivation.
revenue due to the behavioral response is 
equal to 
(3)  dB ≡ −N · e ·  z m ·  τ _ 
1 − τ . d τ < 0.
Summing the mechanical and the behavioral 
effect, we obtain the total change in tax rev-
enue due to the tax change: 
(4) dR = dM + dB
 = N · ( z m −  _ z)
 · [1 − e ·   z m  _  z m −  _ z ·  τ _ 1 − τ ] · d τ. 
Let us denote by a the ratio  z m /( z m −  _ z). 
Note that in general a ≥ 1, and that a = 1 
when a single flat tax rate applies to all 
incomes, as in this case the top bracket starts 
at zero ( 
_
 z = 0). If the top tail of the distribu-
tion is Pareto distributed,8 then the parame-
ter a does not vary with  
_
 z and is exactly equal 
to the Pareto parameter. As the tails of actual 
income distributions are very well approxi-
mated by Pareto distributions, within a given 
year, the coefficient a is extremely stable in 
the United States for  
_
 z above $300,000 and 
equals approximately 1.5 in recent years.9 
The parameter a measures the thinness of 
the top tail of the income distribution: the 
8 A Pareto distribution has a density function of the form 
f (z) = C/ z 1+α , where C and α are constant parameters. 
The parameter α is called the Pareto parameter. In that 
case,  z m =  ∫ _ z 
∞ z · f (z)· dz/ ∫ _ z 
∞  f (z) · dz =  _ z · α/(α − 1) 
and hence  z m /( z m −  _ z) = α.
9  Saez (2001) provides such an empirical analysis for 
1992 and 1993 reported wage incomes using U.S. tax 
return data. Piketty and Saez (2003) provide estimates 
of thresholds  
_
 z and average incomes  z m corresponding to 
various fractiles within the top decile of the U.S. income 
distribution from 1913 to 2008, allowing a straightforward 
estimation of the parameter a for any year and income 
threshold. As U.S. income concentration has increased in 
recent decades, the Pareto parameter a has correspond-
ingly fallen from about 2 in the 1970s to about 1.5 in most 
recent years.
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thicker the tail of the distribution, the larger 
is  z m relative to  
_
 z, and hence the smaller is a.
Using the definition of a, we can rewrite 
the effect of the small reform on tax revenue 
dR simply as: 
(5) dR = dM · [1 −  τ _ 1 − τ · e · a]. 
Formula (5) shows that the fraction of tax 
revenue lost through behavioral responses—
the second term in the square bracket 
expression—is a simple function increas-
ing in the tax rate τ, the elasticity e, and the 
Pareto parameter a. This expression is of pri-
mary importance to the welfare analysis of 
taxation because τ · e · a/(1 − τ) is exactly 
equal to the marginal deadweight burden 
created by the increase in the tax rate, under 
the assumptions we have made and that we 
discuss below. This can be seen as follows: 
Because of the envelope theorem, the behav-
ioral response to a small tax change dτ cre-
ates no additional welfare loss and thus the 
utility loss (measured in dollar terms) cre-
ated by the tax increase is exactly equal to the 
mechanical effect dM.10 However, tax reve-
nue collected is only dR = dM + dB < dM 
because dB < 0. Thus −dB represents the 
extra amount lost in utility over and above 
the tax revenue collected dR. From (5) and 
because dR = dM + dB, the marginal excess 
burden per dollar of extra taxes collected is 
defined as 
(6)  − dB/dR =  e · a · τ  __ 1 − τ − e · a · τ .
In other words, for each extra dollar of taxes 
raised, the government imposes an extra 
10  Formally, V(1 − τ, E) = max z u(z(1 − τ) + E, z) so 
that d V =  u c · (−zdτ + dE) = − u c · (z −  
_
 z) d τ. There -
fore, the (money-metric) marginal utility cost of the reform 
is indeed equal to the mechanical tax increase, individual 
by individual.
cost equal to −dB/dR > 0 on  taxpayers. 
We can also define the “marginal efficiency 
cost of funds’’ (MECF) as 1 − dB/dR 
= (1 − τ)/(1 − τ − e · a ·τ). These formu-
las are valid for any tax rate τ and income 
distribution as long as income effects are 
assumed away, even if individuals have het-
erogeneous utility functions and behavioral 
elasticities.11 The parameters τ and a are 
relatively straightforward to measure, so 
that the elasticity parameter e is the central 
parameter necessary to calculate formulas 
(5) and (6). Marginal deadweight burden 
or marginal efficiency cost of funds mea-
sure solely efficiency costs and abstract from 
distributional considerations. The optimal 
income tax progressivity literature precisely 
brings together the efficiency formulas 
derived here with welfare weights captur-
ing distributional concerns. Therefore, the 
behavioral response elasticity is also a key 
parameter for characterizing optimal pro-
gressivity (Saez 2001).
To illustrate these formulas, consider the 
following example using U.S. data. In recent 
years, for the top 1 percent income cut-off 
(corresponding approximately to the top 35 
percent federal income tax bracket in that 
year), Piketty and Saez (2003) estimate that 
a = 1.5. When combining the maximum 
federal and average state income, Medicare, 
and typical sales tax rates in the United 
States, the top marginal tax rate for ordinary 
income is 42.5 percent as of 2009.12 For an 
11  In contrast, the Harberger triangle (Harberger 
1964) approximations are valid only for small tax rates. 
This expression also abstracts from any marginal compli-
ance costs caused by raising rates, and from any marginal 
administrative costs unless dR is interpreted as revenue net 
of administrative costs.  See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002).
12  A top federal tax rate of 35 percent, combined with 
an average top state income tax rate of 5.9 percent, the 
Medicare 2.9 percent payroll tax, and an average sales tax 
rate of 2.3 percent generate a total top marginal tax rate of 
42.5 percent, when considering that state income taxes are 
deductible when calculating federal income taxes and the 
employer’s share of the Medicare tax is deductible for both 
state and federal income tax calculations.
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elasticity estimate of e = 0.25 (correspond-
ing, as we discuss later, to the mid-range of 
the estimates from the literature), the frac-
tion of tax revenue lost through behavioral 
responses (−dB/dM), should the top tax rate 
be slightly increased, would be 27.7 percent, 
slightly above a quarter of the mechanical 
(i.e., ignoring behavioral responses) pro-
jected increase in tax revenue. In terms of 
marginal excess burden, increasing tax rev-
enue by dR = $1 causes a utility loss (equal 
to the MECF) of 1/(1 − 0.277) = $1.38 for 
taxpayers, and hence a marginal excess bur-
den of −dB/dR = $0.38, or 38 percent of 
the extra $1 tax collected.
Following the supply-side debates of 
the early 1980s, much attention has been 
focused on the revenue-maximizing tax rate. 
The revenue-maximizing tax rate τ* is such 
that the bracketed expression in equation (5) 
is exactly zero when τ = τ*. Rearranging this 
equation, we obtain the following simple for-
mula for the revenue-maximizing tax rate τ* 
for the top bracket: 
(7) τ* =  1 _ 1 + a · e . 
A top tax rate above τ* is inefficient because 
decreasing the tax rate would both increase 
the utility of the affected taxpayers with 
income above  
_
 z and increase government 
revenue, which could in principle be used 
to benefit other taxpayers.13 The optimal 
income taxation literature following Mirrlees 
(1971) shows that formula (7) is the opti-
mal top tax rate if the social marginal util-
ity of consumption decreases to zero when 
income is large (see Saez 2001). At the 
tax rate τ*, the marginal excess  burden 
13 Formally, this a second-best Pareto-inefficient out-
come as there is a feasible government policy that can pro-
duce a Pareto improvement, ignoring the possibility that 
the utility of some individuals enters negatively in the util-
ity functions of others.
becomes infinite as  raising more tax rev-
enue becomes impossible. Using our pre-
vious example with e = 0.25 and a = 1.5, 
the  revenue-maximizing tax rate τ* would 
be 72.7 percent, much higher than the cur-
rent U.S. top tax rate of 42.5 percent when 
combining all taxes. Keeping state income 
and sales taxes, and Medicare taxes con-
stant, this would correspond to a top federal 
individual income tax rate of 68.4 percent, 
very substantially higher than the current 
35 percent but lower than the top federal 
income tax rate prior to 1982.
Note that when the tax system has a single 
tax rate (i.e., when  
_
 z = 0), the tax-revenue-
maximizing rate becomes the well-known 
expression τ* = 1/(1 + e). As a ≥ 1, the 
revenue-maximizing flat rate is always larger 
than the revenue-maximizing rate applied to 
high incomes only. This is because increasing 
just the top tax rate collects extra taxes only 
on the portion of incomes above the bracket 
threshold  
_
 z, but produces a behavioral 
response for high-income taxpayers as large 
as an identical across-the-board increase in 
marginal tax rates.
Giertz (2009) applies the formulas pre-
sented in this section to tax return data 
from published Statistics of Income tables 
produced by the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) to analyze the impact of the potential 
expiration of the Bush administration tax 
cuts in 2011. Giertz shows that exactly where 
the ETI falls within the range found in the 
empirical literature has significant effects 
on the efficiency and revenue implications 
for tax policy. For example, Giertz reports 
that for ETIs of 0.2, 0.5, and 1.0, behav-
ioral responses would respectively erase 12, 
31, and 62 percent of the mechanical rev-
enue gain. When offsets to payroll and state 
income taxes are taken into account, these 
numbers increase by 28 percent. Likewise, 
estimates for the marginal cost of public 
funds and the revenue-maximizing rates are 
quite sensitive to this range of ETIs.
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In the basic model we have considered, the 
ETI e is a sufficient statistic to estimate the 
efficiency costs of taxation as it is not neces-
sary to estimate the structural parameters of 
the underlying individual preferences. Such 
sufficient statistics for welfare and normative 
analysis have been used in various contexts 
in the field of public economics in recent 
years (see Chetty 2009c for a recent survey). 
However, it is important to understand the 
limitations of this approach and the strong 
assumptions required to apply it, as we show 
in the next subsections.
2.2 Fiscal Externalities and Income Shifting
The analysis has assumed so far that the 
reduction in reported incomes due to a tax 
rate increase has no other effect on tax rev-
enue. This is a reasonable assumption if 
the reduction in incomes is due to reduced 
labor supply (and hence an increase in 
untaxed leisure time), or due to a shift from 
taxable cash compensation toward untaxed 
fringe benefits or perquisites (more gener-
ous health insurance, better offices, com-
pany cars, etc.) or tax evasion. However, in 
many instances the reduction in reported 
incomes is due in part to a shift away from 
taxable individual income toward other 
forms of taxable income such as corporate 
income, or deferred compensation that will 
be taxable to the individual at a later date 
(see Slemrod 1998). For example, Slemrod 
(1996) and Gordon and Slemrod (2000) 
argue that part of the surge in top individual 
incomes after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
in the United States, which reduced indi-
vidual income tax rates relative to corporate 
tax rates (see appendix A), was due to a shift 
of taxable income from the corporate sector 
toward the individual sector.
For a tax change in a given base z, we 
define a fiscal externality as a change in the 
present value of tax revenue that occurs in 
any tax base z′ other than z due to the behav-
ioral response of private agents to the tax 
change in the initial base z. The alternative 
tax base z′ can be a different tax base in the 
same time period or the same tax base in a 
different time period. The notion of fiscal 
externality is therefore dependent on the 
scope of the analysis both along the base 
dimension and the time dimension. In the 
limit, where the analysis encompasses all 
tax bases and all time periods (and hence 
focuses on the total present discounted value 
of total tax revenue), there can by definition 
be no fiscal externalities.
To see the implication of income shifting, 
assume that a fraction s < 1 of the income 
that disappears from the individual income 
tax base following the tax rate increase dτ is 
shifted to other bases and is taxed on average 
at rate t. For example, if half of the reduc-
tion in individual reported incomes is due to 
increased (untaxed) leisure and half is due 
to a shift toward the corporate sector, then 
s = 1/2 and t would be equal to the effective 
tax rate on corporate income.14 In the general 
case, a behavioral response dz now generates 
a tax revenue change equal to (τ − s · t) · dz. 
As a result, the change in tax revenue due to 
the behavioral response becomes: 
(8) dB = −N · e ·  z m ·  τ _ 
1 − τ · dτ
 + N · e ·  z m ·  s · t _ 
1 − τ · dτ.
Therefore, formula (5) for the effect of a 
small reform on total tax revenue becomes: 
(9) dR = dM + dB
 = dM · [1 −  τ − s · t _1 − τ  · e · a]. 
14 It is possible to have t > τ, for example if there 
are (nontax) advantages to the corporate form. If all the 
response is shifting (s = 1), dτ > 0 would actually then 
lead to behavioral responses increasing total tax revenue 
and hence reducing deadweight burden.
01_Saez.indd   10 2/27/12   3:49 PM
11Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz: The Elasticity of Taxable Income
The same envelope theorem logic applies for 
welfare analysis: the income that is shifted 
to another tax base at the margin does 
not generate any direct change in welfare 
because the taxpayer is indifferent between 
reporting marginal income in the individual 
income tax base versus the alternative tax 
base. Therefore, as above, −dB represents 
the marginal deadweight burden of the indi-
vidual income tax, and the marginal excess 
burden expressed in terms of extra taxes col-
lected can be written as 
(10) −  dB _
dR
 =  e · a · (τ − s · t)  __   
1 − τ − e · a · (τ − s · t) . 
The revenue-maximizing tax rate (7) 
becomes: 
(11)   τ s * =  
1 + s · t · a · e  __ 1 + a · e  >  τ 
* .
If we assume again that a = 1.5, e = 0.25, 
τ = 0.425, but that half (s = 0.5) of marginal 
income disappearing from the individual base 
is taxed on average at t = 0.3,15 the fraction 
of revenue lost due to behavioral responses 
drops from 27.7 percent to 17.9 percent, and 
the marginal excess burden (expressed as a 
percentage of extra taxes raised) decreases 
from 38 percent to 22 percent. The revenue-
maximizing tax rate increases from 72.7 per-
cent to 76.8 percent.
This simple theoretical analysis shows 
therefore that, in addition to estimating the 
elasticity e, it is critical to analyze whether 
the source or destination of changes in 
reported individual incomes is another tax 
base, either a concurrent one or in another 
time period. Thus two additional param-
eters, in addition to the taxable income elas-
ticity e, are crucial in the estimation of the 
tax revenue effects and marginal deadweight 
15    We show below that s = 0.5 and t = 0.3 are realistic 
numbers to capture the shift from corporate to individual 
taxable income following the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
burden: (1) the extent to which individual 
income changes in the first tax base z shift 
to another form of income that is taxable, 
characterized by parameter s, and (2) the tax 
rate t at which the income shifted is taxed. 
In practice, there are many possibilities for 
such shifting and measuring empirically all 
the shifting effects is challenging, especially 
in the case of shifting across time. The recent 
literature has addressed several channels for 
such fiscal externalities. Alternatively, one 
could identify shifting by looking directly at 
the overall revenue from all sources.
2.2.1 Individual versus Corporate Income 
 Tax Base
Most countries tax corporate profits 
with a separate corpor  ate income tax.16 
Unincorporated business profits (such as 
sole proprietorships or partnerships) are in 
general taxed directly at the individual level. 
In the United States, closely held corpora-
tions with few shareholders (less than 100 
currently) can elect to become Subchapter S 
corporations and be taxed solely at the indi-
vidual level. Such businesses are also called 
pass-through entities. Therefore, the choice 
of business organization (regular corporation 
taxed by the corporate income tax versus 
pass-through entity taxed solely at the indi-
vidual level) might respond to the relative tax 
rates on corporate versus individual income.
For example, if the individual income tax 
rate increases, some businesses taxed at the 
16 Net-of-tax corporate profits are generally taxed 
again at the individual level when paid out as dividends 
to individual shareholders. Many OECD countries allevi-
ate such double taxation of corporate profits by providing 
tax credits or preferential tax treatment for dividends. If 
profits are retained in the corporation, they increase the 
value of the company stock and those profits may, as in the 
United States, be taxed as realized capital gains when the 
individual owners eventually sell the stock. In general, the 
individual level of taxation of corporate profits is lower than 
the ordinary individual tax on unincorporated businesses 
so that the combined tax on corporate profits and distrib-
uted profits may be lower than the direct individual tax for 
individuals subject to high marginal individual tax rates.
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individual level may choose to incorporate 
where they would be subjected to the cor-
porate income tax instead.17 In that case, 
the standard taxable income elasticity might 
be large and the individual income tax rev-
enue consequences significant. However, 
corporate income tax revenue will increase 
and partially offset the loss in revenue on 
the individual side. It is possible to provide 
a micro-founded model capturing those 
effects.18 If businesses face heterogeneous 
costs of switching organizational form (rep-
resenting both transaction costs and nontax 
considerations) and the aggregate shifting 
response to tax rate changes is smooth, then 
marginal welfare analysis would still be appli-
cable. As a result, formula (9) is a sufficient 
statistic to derive the welfare costs of taxation 
in that case.19 Estimating s and t empirically 
would require knowing the imputed corpo-
rate profits of individual shareholders.
This issue was quite significant for analy-
ses of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 because of 
the sharp decline (and change in sign!) in the 
difference between the top personal and cor-
porate tax rates, which created an incentive 
to shift business income from the corpora-
tion tax base to pass-through entities such as 
partnerships or Subchapter S corporations, 
so that the business income shows up in the 
individual income tax base (see appendix A 
for a description of the 1986 tax reform). 
This phenomenon was indeed widespread 
immediately after the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 (documented by Slemrod 1996, Robert 
17 Again, to the extent that dividends and capital gains 
are taxed, shareholders would not entirely escape the indi-
vidual income tax.
18 Alvaredo and Saez (2009) develop such a model in 
the case of the Spanish wealth tax, under which stock in 
closely held companies is excluded from the wealth tax for 
individuals who own at least 15 percent of the business and 
are substantially involved in management.
19  It is a reduced-form formula because a change in the 
rules about business organization would in general change 
the behavioral elasticity.
Carroll and David Joulfaian 1997, and Saez 
2004b among others).
2.2.2 Timing Responses
If individuals anticipate that a tax increase 
will happen soon, such as when President 
Clinton was elected in late 1992 on a pro-
gram to raise top individual tax rates, which 
was indeed implemented in 1993, they have 
incentives to accelerate taxable income real-
izations before the tax change takes place.20 
As a result, reported taxable income just after 
the reform will be lower than otherwise. In 
that case, the tax increase has a positive fis-
cal externality on the pre-reform period that 
ought to be taken into account in a welfare 
analysis.
As we will see below, this issue of reti-
ming is particularly important in the case 
of realized capital gains21 and stock-option 
exercises (Goolsbee 2000b) because indi-
viduals can easily time the realization of such 
income. Parcell (1995) and Sammartino and 
Weiner (1997) document the large shift of 
taxable income into 1992 from 1993 (even 
when excluding capital gains) in response 
to the tax increase on high-income earners 
promised by President-elect Bill Clinton, 
and enacted in early 1993. 
The labor supply literature started with 
a static framework and then developed a 
dynamic framework with intertemporal sub-
stitution to distinguish between responses 
to temporary versus permanent changes in 
wage rates (MaCurdy 1981). In this frame-
work, differential responses arise because, 
and only because, the income effects of 
 temporary versus permanent changes 
20  Anticipated tax decreases would have the opposite 
effect.
21 A well-known example is the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 
1986, which increased the top tax rate on realized long-
term capital gains from 20 percent to 28 percent beginning 
in 1987, and generated a surge in capital gains realizations 
at the end of 1986 (Auerbach 1988; Burman, Clausing, and 
O’Hare 1994).
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 differ.22 The ETI literature has focused 
on a simpler framework (usually) with no 
income effects and within which intertem-
poral issues cannot be modeled adequately. 
This is an important issue to keep in mind 
when evaluating existing empirical studies 
of the ETI; future research should develop 
an intertemporal framework to account for 
expected future tax rate changes, so as to 
distinguish responses to temporarily high, or 
low, tax rates. Such a dynamic framework has 
been developed for specific components of 
taxable income such as realized capital gains 
(Burman and Randolph 1994) and charitable 
contributions (Bakija and Heim 2008).
If current income tax rates increase, but 
long-term future expected income tax rates 
do not, individuals might decide to defer 
some of their incomes, for example, in the 
form of future pension payments23 (deferred 
compensation) or future realized capital 
gains.24 In that case, a current tax increase 
might have a positive fiscal externality in 
future years; such a fiscal externality affects 
the welfare cost of taxation as we described 
above. A similar issue applies whenever a 
change in tax rates affects business invest-
ment decisions undertaken by individuals. 
If, for example, a lower tax rate induces sole 
proprietors or principals in pass-through 
entities to expand investment, the short-term 
effect on taxable income may be  negative, 
 reflecting the deductible net expenses in the 
early years of an investment project.
22   In the labor supply literature, responses to tempo-
rary wage rate changes are captured by the Frisch elastic-
ity, which is higher than the compensated elasticity with 
respect to permanent changes.
23  In the United States, individual workers can elec-
tively set aside a fraction of their earnings into pension 
plans (traditional IRAs and 401(k)s) or employers can pro-
vide increased retirement contributions at the expense of 
current compensation. In both cases, those pension contri-
butions are taxed as income when the money is withdrawn.
24 For example, companies, on behalf of their share-
holders, may decide to reduce current dividend payments 
and retain earnings that generate capital gains that are 
taxed later when the stock is sold.
As already noted, the ETI and MDWL 
concepts are relevant for the optimal design 
of the tax and transfer system, because they 
increase the economic cost of the higher mar-
ginal tax rates needed to effect redistribu-
tion. Importantly, though, they do not enter 
directly into an evaluation of deficit-financed 
tax cuts (or deficit-reducing tax increases). 
This is because, with a fixed time pattern of 
government expenditure, tax cuts now must 
eventually be offset by tax increases later. 
Ignoring the effects of one period’s tax rate 
on other periods’ taxable income, if the ETI 
is relatively large a current tax cut will cause 
a relatively large increase in current taxable 
income. Offsetting this, however, is the fact 
that when the offsetting tax increases occur 
later, the high ETI (and there is no reason 
to think it will go up or down over time) 
will generate relatively big decreases in tax-
able income at that time. Accounting for the 
intertemporal responses, both of the real and 
income-shifting variety, to time-varying tax 
rate changes suggests that a deficit-financed 
tax cut that, by definition, collects no revenue 
in present value will cause deadweight loss 
by distorting the timing of taxable income 
flows.
2.2.3 Long-Term Responses
One might expect short-term tax responses 
to be larger than longer-term responses 
because people may be able to easily shift 
income between adjacent years without alter-
ing real behavior. However, adjusting to a tax 
change might take time (as individuals might 
decide to change their career or educational 
choices or businesses might change their 
long-term investment decisions) and thus 
the relative magnitude of the two responses 
is theoretically ambiguous. The long-term 
response is of most interest for policy mak-
ing although, as we discuss below, the long-
term response is more difficult to identify 
empirically. The empirical literature has pri-
marily focused on short-term (one year) and 
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medium-term (up to five year) responses, 
and is not able to convincingly identify very 
long-term responses.
The issue of long-term responses is par-
ticularly important in the case of capital 
income, as capital income is the consequence 
of past savings and investment decisions. 
For example, a higher top income tax rate 
might discourage wealth accumulation or 
contribute to the dissipation of existing for-
tunes faster. Conversely, reductions in this 
rate might trigger an increase in the growth 
rate of capital income for high-income indi-
viduals. The new long-term wealth distribu-
tion equilibrium might not be reached for 
decades or even generations, which makes it 
particularly difficult to estimate. Estimating 
the effects on capital accumulation would 
require developing a dynamic model of tax 
responses, which has not yet been developed 
in the context of the ETI literature. This 
would be a promising way to connect the 
ETI literature to the macroeconomic litera-
ture on savings behavior.
2.2.4 Tax Evasion
Suppose that a tax increase leads to a 
higher level of tax evasion.25 In that case, 
there might be increases in taxes collected 
on evading taxpayers following audits. This 
increased audit-generated tax revenue is 
another form of a positive fiscal externality. 
In practice, most empirical studies are car-
ried out using tax return data before audits 
take place, and therefore do not fully capture 
the revenue consequences. Chetty (2009b) 
makes this point formally and shows that, 
under risk neutrality assumptions, at the 
margin the tax revenue lost due to increased 
tax evasion is exactly recouped (in expecta-
tion) by increased tax revenue collected at 
audit. As a result, in that case the elasticity 
that matters for deadweight burden is not 
25  Whether in theory one would expect this response is 
not clear. See Yitzhaki (1974).
the elasticity of reported income, but instead 
the elasticity of actual income.
2.2.5 Other Fiscal Externalities
Changes in reported incomes might also 
have consequences for bases other than fed-
eral income taxes. An obvious example is 
the case of state income taxes in the United 
States. If formula (6) is applied to the fed-
eral income tax only, it will not capture the 
externality on state income tax revenue (as 
states in general use almost the same income 
tax base as the federal government). Thus 
our original analysis should be based on the 
combined federal and state income tax rates. 
Changes in reported individual income due 
to real changes in economic behavior (such 
as reduced labor supply) can also have con-
sequences for consumption taxes. In par-
ticular, a broad-based value added tax is 
economically equivalent to an income tax 
(with expensing) and therefore should also 
be included in the tax rate used for welfare 
computations.
Finally, fiscal externalities may also arise 
due to classical general equilibrium tax inci-
dence effects. For example, a reduced tax 
rate on high incomes might stimulate labor 
supply of workers in highly paid occupa-
tions, and hence could decrease their pre-
tax wage rate while reducing labor supply 
and thus increasing pretax wage rates of 
lower-paid occupations.26 Such incidence 
effects are effectively transfers from some 
factors of production (high-skilled labor in 
our example) to other factors of production 
(low-skilled labor). If different factors are 
taxed at different rates (due for example to 
26   Such effects are extremely difficult to convincingly 
estimate empirically. Kubik (2004) attempts such an analy-
sis and finds that, controlling for occupation-specific time 
trends in wage rates, individuals in occupations that expe-
rienced large decreases in their median marginal tax rates 
due to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 received lower pre-tax 
wages after 1986 as the number of workers and the hours 
worked in these professions increased.
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a progressive income tax), then those inci-
dence effects will have fiscal consequences. 
However, because those incidence effects 
are transfers, in principle the government 
can readjust tax rates on each factor to undo 
those incidence effects at no fiscal cost. 
Therefore, in a standard competitive model, 
incidence effects do not matter for the effi-
ciency analysis or for optimal tax design.27 
2.3 Classical Externalities
There are situations where individual 
responses to taxation may involve clas-
sical externalities. Two often mentioned 
cases are charitable giving and mortgage 
interest payments for residential housing, 
which in the United States and some other 
countries may be deductible from taxable 
income, a tax treatment which is often jus-
tified on the grounds of classical exter-
nalities. Contributions to charitable causes 
create positive externalities if contributions 
increase the utility of the beneficiaries of the 
nonprofit organizations. To the extent that 
mortgage interest deductions increase home 
ownership, they can arguably create posi-
tive externalities in neighborhoods. In both 
cases, however, there are reasons to be skep-
tical of the externality argument in practice. 
Using U.S. and French tax reforms, Fack and 
Landais (2010) show that the response of 
charitable deductions to tax rates is concen-
trated primarily along the avoidance margin 
(rather than the real contribution margin).28 
Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) examine the U.S. 
 mortgage interest deduction and conclude 
that it subsidizes housing ownership along 
the intensive margin (size of the home) but 
27 Indeed, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) showed that 
optimal tax formulas are the same in a model with fixed 
prices of factors (with no incidence effects) and in a model 
with variable prices (with incidence effects).
28  There is a large earlier literature finding signifi-
cant responses of charitable giving to individual marginal 
income tax rates. See, for example, Auten, Sieg, and 
Clotfelter (2002).
not the extensive margin (home ownership) 
and that there is little evidence of externali-
ties along the intensive margin. Moreover, 
granting the existence of such externalities 
does not imply that the implicit rate of sub-
sidy approximates marginal social benefit.
Theoretically, suppose a fraction s of the 
taxable income response to a tax rate increase 
dτ is due to higher expenditures on activities 
that create an externality with a social mar-
ginal value of exactly t dollars per dollar of 
additional expenditure. In that case, formula 
(8) applies by just substituting the alternative 
tax base rate t with −1 multiplied by the per 
dollar social marginal value of the external-
ity. For example, in the extreme case where 
all the taxable income response comes from 
tax expenditures (s = 1) with income before 
tax expenditures being unresponsive to tax 
rates, and if t = τ (the social marginal value 
of tax expenditures externalities is equal to 
the income tax rate τ) then there is zero mar-
ginal excess burden from taxation as it is a 
pure Pigouvian tax.29 More generally, to the 
extent that the behavioral response to higher 
tax rates generates some positive externali-
ties, formula (3) will overstate the marginal 
efficiency cost of taxation.
Because the bulk of items that are deduct-
ible from taxable income in the United 
States—state and local income taxes, mort-
gage interest deductions, and charitable 
giving—may generate fiscal or classical exter-
nalities, the elasticity of a broader, prededuc-
tion, concept of income (such as adjusted 
gross income in the United States) is of inter-
est in addition to a taxable income elasticity. 
That is why many conceptual and empirical 
analyses focus on adjusted gross income—
which is not net of such deductible items—
rather than taxable income. The elasticity of 
taxable income and the elasticity of a broader 
measure of income may bracket the elasticity 
29  Saez (2004a) develops a simple optimal tax model to 
capture those effects.
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applicable to welfare analysis. As discussed 
above, we are skeptical that itemized deduc-
tions in the U.S. tax code necessarily produce 
strong positive externalities. Therefore, we 
will ignore this possibility and treat itemized 
deduction responses to tax rates as efficiency 
costs in the following sections.
Classical externalities might also arise in 
agency models where executives set their 
own pay by expending efforts to influence 
the board of directors.30 It is conceivable 
that such pay-setting efforts depend on the 
level of the top income tax rate and would 
increase following a top tax rate cut. In 
such a case, top executives’ compensation 
increases come at the expense of share-
holders’ returns, which produces a nega-
tive externality.31 Such an externality would 
reduce the efficiency costs of taxation (as in 
that case correcting the externality dictates 
a positive tax).
2.4 Changes in the Tax Base Definition and 
Tax Erosion
As pointed out by Slemrod (1995) and 
Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002), how broadly 
the tax base is defined affects the taxable 
income elasticity. In their model, the more 
tax deductions that are allowed, the higher 
will be the taxable income elasticity. This 
implies that the taxable income elasticity 
depends not only on individual  preferences 
(as we posited in our basic model in section 
2.1), but also on the tax structure. Therefore, 
30  Under perfect information and competition, execu-
tives would not be able to set their pay at a different level 
from their marginal product. In reality, the marginal prod-
uct of top executives cannot be perfectly observed, which 
creates scope for influencing pay, as discussed extensively 
in Bebchuk and Fried (2004).
31  Such externalities would fit into the framework devel-
oped by Chetty (2009b). Following the analysis of Chetty 
and Saez (2010), such agency models produce an external-
ity only if the pay contract is not second-best Pareto effi-
cient, e.g., it is set by executives and large shareholders on 
the board without taking into account the best interests of 
small shareholders outside the board.
the tax base choice affects the taxable income 
elasticity. Thus, as Slemrod and Kopczuk 
(2002) argue, the ETI can be thought of as a 
policy choice. The same logic applies to the 
enforcement of a given tax base, which can 
particularly affect the behavioral response to 
tax rate changes of avoidance schemes and 
evasion.
To see this point, suppose that we estimate 
a large taxable income elasticity because the 
tax base includes many loopholes making 
it easy to shelter income from tax (we dis-
cuss in detail such examples using U.S. tax 
reforms below). In the model of section 2.1, 
this suggests that a low tax rate is optimal. 
However, in a broader context, a much bet-
ter policy may be to eliminate loopholes so 
as to reduce the taxable income elasticity 
and the deadweight burden of taxation.32 For 
example, Gruber and Saez (2002) estimate 
that the taxable income elasticity for upper 
income earners is 0.57, leading to a revenue 
maximizing rate of only 54 percent using for-
mula (7) with a = 1.5. However, they find a 
much lower elasticity of 0.17 for a broader 
income definition for upper incomes, imply-
ing that the revenue maximizing tax rate 
would be as high as 80 percent if the income 
tax base were broadened.33 
Consider a simple example that illustrates 
this argument. As in our basic model, indi-
viduals supply effort to earn income z. Now 
allow that individuals can, at some cost, shel-
ter part of their income z into another form 
that might receive preferable tax treatment. 
Let us denote w + y = z, where y is shel-
tered income and w is unsheltered income. 
Formally, individuals maximize a utility func-
tion of the form u(c, z, y) that is decreasing 
in z (earning income requires effort) and y 
(sheltering income is costly). Suppose we 
32  This possibility is developed in the context of an opti-
mal linear income tax in Slemrod (1994).
33 Both scenarios assume away fiscal and classical exter-
nalities in behavioral responses.
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start from a comprehensive tax base where z 
is taxed at rate τ, so that c = (1 − τ) · z + E 
(E denotes a lump-sum transfer). In that 
case, sheltering income is costly and provides 
no tax benefit; individuals choose y = 0, and 
the welfare analysis proceeds as in section 
3.1 where the relevant elasticity is the elas-
ticity of total income z with respect to 1 − τ.
Now recognize that the tax base is eroded 
by excluding y from taxation. In that case, 
c = (1 − τ) · w + y + E = (1 − τ) · z + 
τ · y + E. Therefore, individuals will find it 
profitable to shelter their income up to the 
point where τ ·  u c =  u y . We can define the 
indirect utility v(c′, w) = ma x y u(c′ + y, w + 
y, y) and the analysis of section 3.1 applies 
using the elasticity of taxable income w with 
respect to 1 − τ. Because w = z − y and 
sheltered income y responds (positively) to 
the tax rate τ, the elasticity of w is larger than 
the elasticity of z and hence the deadweight 
burden of taxation per dollar raised is higher 
with the narrower base. Intuitively, giving 
preferential treatment to y induces taxpayers 
to waste resources to shelter income y, which 
is pure deadweight burden. As a result, start-
ing from the eroded tax base and introduc-
ing a small tax dt > 0 on y actually reduces 
the deadweight burden from taxation, show-
ing that the eroded tax base is a suboptimal 
policy choice.34 
Therefore, comprehensive tax bases with 
low elasticities are preferable to narrow 
bases with large elasticities. Of course this 
conclusion abstracts from possible legitimate 
reasons for narrowing the tax base, such as 
administrative simplicity (as in the model of 
Slemrod and Kopczuk 2002),35 redistributive 
34  This can be proved easily in a separable model with 
no income effects where u(c, z, y) = c −  h 1 (z) −  h 2 (y).
35  In many practical cases, however, tax systems with a 
comprehensive tax base (such as a value added tax) may be 
administratively simpler than a complex income tax with 
many exemptions and a narrower base.
concerns, and externalities such as charitable 
contributions, as discussed above.36 
3. Empirical Estimation and 
Identification Issues
3.1 A Framework to Analyze the 
Identification Issues
To assess the validity of the empirical 
methods used to estimate the ETI and to 
explicate the key identification issues, it 
is useful to consider a very basic model of 
income reporting behavior. In year t, individ-
ual i reports income  z it and faces a marginal 
tax rate of  τ it = T′( z it ). Assume that reported 
income  z it responds to marginal tax rates with 
elasticity e so that z it =  z it 0 · (1 −  τ it ) e , where 
z it 0 is income reported when the marginal tax 
rate is zero, which we call potential income.37 
Therefore, using logs, we have: 
(12) log  z it = e · log(1 −  τ it ) + log  z it 0 . 
Note, in light of our previous preceding 
discussion, the assumptions that are embed-
ded in this simple model: (a) there are no 
income effects on reported income (as vir-
tual income E is excluded from specification 
(12), (b) the response to tax rates is immedi-
ate and permanent (so that short-term and 
long-term elasticities are identical), (c) the 
elasticity e is constant over time and uniform 
across individuals at all levels of income,38 (d) 
individuals have perfect knowledge of the tax 
structure and choose  z it after they know the 
36  The public choice argument that narrow bases con-
strain Leviathan governments would fall in that category, 
as a Leviathan government produces a negative externality.
37  A quasi-linear utility function of the form 
u(c, z) = c −  z 0 (z/ z 0 ) 1+1/e /(1 + 1/e) generates such in-
come response functions.
38 This assumption can be relaxed in most cases, but it 
sometimes has important consequences for identification, 
as we discuss below.
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exact realization of potential income  z it 0. We 
revisit these assumptions below.
Even within the context of this simple 
model, an OLS regression of log  z it on 
log (1 −  τ it ) would not identify the elasticity 
e in the presence of a graduated income tax 
schedule because  τ it is positively correlated 
with potential log-income log  z it 0; this occurs 
because the marginal tax rate may increase 
with realized income z. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to find instruments correlated with  τ it , 
but uncorrelated with potential log-income, 
log  z it 0, to identify the elasticity e.39 The recent 
taxable income elasticity literature has used 
changes in the tax rate structure created 
by tax reforms to obtain such instruments. 
Intuitively, in order to isolate the effects of 
the net-of-tax rate, one would want to com-
pare observed reported incomes after the tax 
rate change to the incomes that would have 
been reported had the tax change not taken 
place. Obviously, the latter are not observed 
and must be estimated. We describe in this 
section the methods that have been pro-
posed to estimate e and to address this iden-
tification issue.
3.2 Simple before and after Reform 
Comparison
One simple approach uses reported 
incomes before a tax reform as a proxy for 
reported incomes after the reform (had the 
reform not taken place). This simple differ-
ence estimation method amounts to com-
paring reported incomes before and after 
the reform and attributing the change in 
reported incomes to the changes in tax rates.
39  This issue arises in any context where the effective 
price of the studied behavior depends on the marginal 
income tax rate, such as charitable contributions. In a case 
such as this, though, a powerful instrument is the marginal 
tax rate that would apply in the event of zero contributions, 
a “first-dollar” marginal tax rate. When the studied behav-
ior is taxable income, this instrument is not helpful, as it is 
generally zero for everyone.
Suppose that all tax rates change at 
time t = 1 because of a tax reform. Using 
repeated cross sections spanning the pre- and 
 post-reform periods, one can estimate the 
following two-stage-least-squares regression: 
(13) log  z it = e · log(1 −  τ it ) +  ε it , 
using the post-reform indicator 1(t ≥ 1) as 
an instrument for log(1 −  τ it ). This regres-
sion identifies e if  ε it is uncorrelated with 
1(t ≥ 1). In the context of our simple model 
(12), this requires that potential log-incomes 
are not correlated with time. This assump-
tion is very unlikely to hold in practice, as real 
economic growth creates a direct correlation 
between income and time. If more than two 
years of data are available, one could add a 
linear trend β · t in (13) to control for secu-
lar growth. However, as growth rates vary 
year-to-year due to macroeconomic business 
cycles, the elasticity estimate will be biased 
if economic growth happens to be differ-
ent from year t = 0 to year t = 1 for reasons 
unrelated to the level of tax rates; in this case 
the regression will ascribe to the tax change 
the impact of an unrelated, but coincident 
change in average incomes.
In many contexts, however, tax reforms 
affect subgroups of the population differen-
tially, and in some cases they leave tax rates 
essentially unchanged for most of the popu-
lation. For example, in the United States 
during the last three decades, the largest 
absolute changes in tax rates have taken 
place at the top of the income distribution, 
with much smaller changes on average in 
the broad middle. In that context, one can 
use the group less (or not at all) affected by 
the tax change as a control and hence proxy 
unobserved income changes in the affected 
group (absent the tax reform) with changes 
in reported income in the control group. 
Such methods naturally lead to consider-
ation of difference-in-differences estimation 
methods discussed in section 3.4.
01_Saez.indd   18 2/27/12   3:49 PM
19Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz: The Elasticity of Taxable Income
3.3 Share Analysis
When the group affected by the tax 
reform is relatively small, one can simply 
normalize incomes of the group affected by 
a tax change by the average income in the 
population to control for macroeconomic 
growth. Indeed, recently the most dramatic 
changes in U.S. marginal federal income tax 
rates have taken place at the top percentile 
of the income distribution. Therefore, and 
following Feenberg and Poterba (1993) and 
Slemrod (1996), a natural measure of the 
evolution of top incomes relative to the aver-
age is the change in the share of total income 
reported by the top percentile.40 Panel A 
of figure 1 displays the average marginal 
tax rate (weighted by income) faced by the 
top percentile of income earners (scaled on 
the left y-axis) along with the share of total 
personal income reported by the top per-
centile earners (scaled on the right y-axis) 
from 1960 to 2006.41 The figure shows that 
since 1980 the marginal tax rate faced by 
the top 1 percent has declined dramatically. 
It is striking to note that the share received 
by the top 1 percent of income recipients 
started to increase precisely after 1981—
when marginal tax rates started to decline. 
Furthermore, the timing of the jump in the 
share of top incomes from 1986 to 1988 cor-
responds exactly with a sharp drop in the 
weighted average marginal tax rate from 45 
percent to 29 percent after the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986. These correspondences in tim-
ing, first noted by Feenberg and Poterba 
(1993), provide circumstantial, but quite 
compelling evidence that the reported 
40 In what follows, we always exclude realized capital 
gains from our income measure, as realized capital gains 
in general receive preferential tax treatment, and there is 
a large literature analyzing specifically capital gains realiza-
tion behavior and taxes (see Auerbach 1988 for a discussion 
of this topic). This issue is revisited in section 4.1.
41  This figure is an update of a figure presented in Saez 
(2004b).
incomes of the  high-income individuals are 
indeed responsive to marginal tax rates.
Panel B of figure 1 shows the same income 
share and marginal tax rate series for the next 
9 percent of highest-income tax filers (i.e., 
the top decile excluding the top 1 percent 
from panel A). Their marginal tax rate fol-
lows a different pattern, first increasing from 
1960 to 1981 due primarily to bracket creep 
(as the tax system in this period was not 
indexed for inflation), followed by a decline 
until 1988 and relative stability afterwards. 
In contrast to the top 1 percent, however, the 
share of the next 9 percent in total income 
is very smooth and trends slightly upward 
during the entire period. Most importantly, 
it displays no correlation with the level of the 
marginal tax rate either in the short run or in 
the long run. Thus, the comparison of panel 
A and panel B suggests that the behavioral 
responses of the top 1 percent are very dif-
ferent from those of the rest of the top decile, 
and hence that the elasticity e is unlikely to 
be constant across income groups.
Using the series displayed in figure 1, 
and assuming that there is no tax change for 
individuals outside the top groups, one can 
estimate the elasticity of reported income 
around a tax reform episode taking place 
between pre-reform year  t 0 and post-reform 
year  t 1 as follows: 
(14) e =  
log  p  t 1  − log  p  t 0    __  
log(1 −  τ p, t 1  ) − log(1 −  τ p, t 0  )
 ,
where  p t is the share of income accruing to 
the top 1 percent (or the next 9 percent) 
earners in year t and  τ p,t is the average mar-
ginal tax rate (weighted by income) faced by 
taxpayers in this income group in year t. This 
method identifies the elasticity if, absent the 
tax change, the top 1 percent income share 
would have remained constant from year 
t 0 to year  t 1 . As shown in table 1, panel A, 
applying this simple method using the series 
depicted in figure 1 around the 1981 tax 
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Figure 1. Top Income Shares and Marginal Tax Rates, 1960–2006
Source: Updated version of figure 2 in Saez (2004). Computations based on income tax return data.
Income excludes realized capital gains, as well as Social Security and unemployment insurance benefits.
The figure displays the income share (right y-axis) and the average marginal tax rate (left y-axis) (weighted by 
income) for the top 1 percent (panel A) and for the next 9 percent (panel B) income earners.
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reform by comparing 1981 and 1984 gener-
ates an elasticity of 0.60 for the top 1 percent. 
Comparing 1986 and 1988 around the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 yields a very large elastic-
ity of 1.36 for the top 1 percent.42 In contrast, 
column 2 in table 1 shows that the elasticities 
for the next 9 percent are much closer to zero 
around those two tax episodes. The 1993 tax 
reform also generates a substantial elasticity 
of 0.45 for the top 1 percent when comparing 
1992 and 1993. Strikingly, though, comparing 
42  Goolsbee (2000a) found a similarly large elas-
ticity using the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and a related 
methodology.
1991 to 1994 yields a negative elasticity for 
the top 1 percent. This difference in elastici-
ties is likely due to retiming of income around 
the 1993 reform, which produced a large 
short-term response, but perhaps no long-
term response. Hence, table 1 shows that the 
elasticity estimates obtained in this way are 
sensitive to the specific reform, the income 
group, as well as the choice of years—impor-
tant issues we will come back to later on.
A natural way to estimate the elasticity e 
using the full time-series evidence is to esti-
mate a time-series regression of the form: 
(15) log  p t = e · log(1 −  τ p,t ) +  ε t . 
TABLE 1  
Elasticity Estimates using Top Income Share Time Series
Top 1 percent Next 9 percent
(1) (2)
Panel A. Tax reform episodes
1981 vs. 1984 (ERTA 1981) 0.60 0.21
1986 vs. 1988 (TRA 1986) 1.36 −0.20
1992 vs. 1993 (OBRA 1993) 0.45
1991 vs. 1994 (OBRA 1993) −0.39
Panel B. Full time series 1960–2006
No time trends 1.71 0.01
(0.31) (0.13)
Linear time trend 0.82 −0.02
(0.20) (0.02)
Linear and square time trends 0.74 −0.05
(0.06) (0.03)
Linear, square, and cube time trends 0.58 −0.02
(0.11) (0.02)
Notes: Estimates in panel A are obtained using series from figure 1 and using the formula e = [log(income share after 
reform)-log(income share before reform)]/[log(1 – MTR after reform) – log(1 – MTR before reform)].
Estimates in panel B are obtained by time-series regression of log(top 1 percent income share) on a constant, log 
(1 – average marginal tax rate), and polynomials time controls from 1960 to 2006 (44 observations). OLS regression. 
Standard errors from Newey-West with eight lags.
01_Saez.indd   21 2/27/12   3:49 PM
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. L (March 2012)22
As reported in table 1, such a regression gen-
erates a very high estimate of the elasticity e 
of 1.71 for the top 1 percent.43 However, this 
is an unbiased estimate only if, absent any 
marginal tax rate changes, the top 1 percent 
income share series would have remained 
constant or moved in a way that is uncorre-
lated with the evolution of marginal tax rates. 
But it is entirely possible that inequality 
changed over time for reasons unrelated to 
tax changes: the secular increase in income 
concentration in the United States since the 
1960s was almost certainly not entirely driven 
by changes in the top tax rates, hence biasing 
upward the estimate of e.44 For example, fig-
ure 1 shows that there was a sharp increase in 
the top 1 percent income share from 1994 to 
2000 in spite of little change in the marginal 
tax rate faced by the top 1 percent, which 
suggests that changes in marginal tax rates 
are not the sole determinant of the evolution 
of top incomes (at least in the short run).45 
It is possible to add controls for various fac-
tors affecting income concentration through 
channels other than tax rates in regression 
(15), as in Slemrod (1996). Unfortunately, 
we do not have a precise understanding of 
what those factors might be. An agnostic 
approach to this problem adds time trends 
to (15). As shown in table 1, such time trends 
substantially reduce the estimated elastic-
ity, although it remains significant and above 
0.5. The key problem is that we do not know 
exactly what time-trend specification is nec-
essary to control for non-tax-related changes, 
43 The estimated elasticity for the next 9 percent is very 
small (e = 0.01), and not significantly different from zero.
44 See Katz and Autor (1999) for a comprehensive anal-
ysis of trends in wage inequality in the United States since 
1960. Reverse causality is also a possibility. If incomes of 
the already affluent increase, the group might have more 
political influence and success in lobbying the government 
to cut top tax rates.
45 Slemrod and Bakija (2001) call the behavior of 
reported taxable income over this period a “nonevent 
study.”
and adding too many time controls necessar-
ily destroys the time-series identification.
It could be fruitful to extend this frame-
work to a multicountry time-series analy-
sis. In that case, global time trends will not 
destroy identification, although it is possible 
that inequality changes differentially across 
countries (for non-tax-related reasons), in 
which case country-specific time trends 
would be required and a similar identification 
problem would arise. Anthony B. Atkinson 
and Andrew Leigh (2010) and Jesper Roine, 
Jonas Vlachos, and Daniel Waldenstrom 
(2009) propose first steps in that direction. 
The macroeconomic literature has recently 
used cross-country time-series analysis to 
analyze the effects of tax rates on aggregate 
labor supply (see, e.g., Ohanian, Raffo, and 
Rogerson 2008), but has not directly exam-
ined tax effects on reported income, let alone 
on reported income by income groups.
3.4 Difference-in-Differences Methods
Most of the recent literature has used 
micro-based regressions using “difference-
in-differences” methods46 in which changes 
in reported income of a treatment group 
(experiencing a tax change) are compared to 
changes for a “control” group (which does not 
experience the same, or any, tax change).47 
To illustrate the identification issues that 
arise with difference-in-differences meth-
ods, we will examine the 1993 tax reform in 
the United States that introduced two new 
income tax brackets—raising rates for those 
at the upper end of incomes from 31 per-
cent (in 1992 and before) to 36 percent or 
39.6 percent (in 1993 and after) and enacted 
46  For earlier reviews of this literature, see Slemrod 
(1998) and Giertz (2004).
47  Note that share analysis is conceptually related to 
the difference-in-differences method as share analysis 
compares the evolution of incomes in a given quantile (the 
numerator of the share is the treatment group) relative to 
the full population (the denominator of the share is implic-
itly the control group).
01_Saez.indd   22 2/27/12   3:49 PM
23Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz: The Elasticity of Taxable Income
only minor other changes (see appendix A for 
details). Figure 1 shows that the average mar-
ginal tax rate for the top 1 percent increased 
sharply from 1992 to 1993, but that the mar-
ginal tax rate for the next 9 percent was not 
affected. Our empirical analysis is based on 
the Treasury panel of tax returns described 
in Giertz (2008). As discussed in appendix 
B, those panel data are created by linking 
the large annual tax return data stratified by 
income used by U.S. government agencies. 
Therefore, the data include a very large num-
ber of top 1 percent taxpayers.
3.4.1 Repeated Cross-Section Analysis
Let us denote by T the group affected by 
the tax change (the top 1 percent in our exam-
ple) and by C a group not affected by the 
reform (the next 9 percent in our example).48 
We denote by  t 0 the pre-reform year and by 
t 1 the post-reform year. Generalizing our ini-
tial specification (13), we can estimate the 
two-stage-least-squares regression: 
(16) log  z it = e · log(1 −  τ it )
 + α · 1(t =  t 1 )
 + β · 1(i ∈ T ) +  ε it ,
on a repeated cross-section sample including 
both the treatment and control groups and 
including the year  t 0 and year  t 1 samples, and 
using as an instrument for log(1 −  τ it ) the 
post-reform and treatment group interaction 
1(t =  t 1 ) · 1(i ∈ T).
Although we refer in this section to 
income tax rate schedule changes as a treat-
ment, they certainly do not represent a clas-
sical treatment in which a random selection 
of taxpayers is presented with a changed tax 
48  Restricting the control group to the next 9 percent 
increases its similarity (absent tax changes) to the treat-
ment group.
rate schedule, while a control group of tax-
payers is not so subject. In fact, in any given 
year all taxpayers of the same filing status 
face the same rate schedule. However, when 
the rates applicable at certain income levels 
change more substantially than the rates at 
other levels of income, some taxpayers are 
more likely to face large changes in the appli-
cable marginal tax rate than other taxpayers. 
However, when the likely magnitude of the 
tax rate change is correlated with income, any 
non-tax-related changes in taxable income 
(i.e.,  z it 0) that vary systematically by income 
group will need to be disentangled from the 
effect on taxable incomes of the rate changes. 
The two-stage-least-squares estimate from 
(16) is a classical difference-in-differences 
estimate equal to: 
(17) e = ([E(log  z i t 1  | T) − E(log  z i t 0  | T)] 
 − [E(log  z i t 1  | C) − E(log  z i t 0  | C)])/
 ([E(log(1 −  τ  i t 1  ) | T) − E(log(1 −  τ i t 0  ) | T)] 
 − [E(log(1 −  τ i t 1  ) | C) − E(log(1 −  τ i t 0  ) | C)]).
Thus, the elasticity estimate is the ratio of the 
pre- to post-reform change in log incomes in 
the treatment group minus the same ratio for 
the control group to the same difference-in-
differences in log net-of-tax rates.
Using repeated cross-sectional data from 
1992 (pre-reform) and 1993 (post-reform), 
we define the treatment group as the top 1 
percent and the control group as the next 9 
percent (90th percentile to 99th percentile). 
This designation is made separately for each 
of the pre- and post-reform years. Note that 
being in the treatment group depends on 
the taxpayer’s behavior. Table 2, panel A 
shows an elasticity estimate of 0.284, which 
reflects the fact that the top 1 percent 
incomes decreased from 1992 to 1993 while 
the next 9 percent incomes remained stable 
as shown in figure 1. However, comparing 
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TABLE 2 
Elasticity Estimates using the 1993 Top Rate Increase among Top 1 percent Incomes
Control group Next 9 percent Next 49 percent
(1) (2)
A. Repeated cross-section analysis
A1. Comparing two years only
1992 and 1993 0.284 0.231
(0.069) (0.069)
1991 and 1994 −0.363 −0.524
(0.077) (0.075)
A2. Using all years 1991 to 1997
1991 to 1997 (no time trends controls) −0.373 −0.641
(0.053) (0.052)
1991 to 1997 (with time trends controls) 0.467 0.504
(0.073) (0.071)
B. Panel analysis
B1. Comparing two years only
1992 to 1993 changes (no controls) 1.395 1.878
(0.107) (0.184)
1991 to 1994 changes (no controls) 2.420 3.352
(0.221) (0.446)
1992 to 1993 changes (log base year income control) −0.721 0.814
(0.213) (0.149)
1992 to 1993 changes (+ splines income controls) −1.669 −1.866
(1.052) (0.711)
B2. Using all 1991–1992, . . . , 1996–1997 changes
No income controls 1.395 1.878
(0.296) (0.338)
Base year log income control 0.537 0.955
(0.264) (0.247)
Base year log income + splines controls 0.564 0.723
(0.259) (0.260)
Base year log income + splines controls 0.143 0.237
(using predicted MTR change instrument) (0.200) (0.077)
Notes: Estimates based on a panel of tax returns (see appendix and Giertz 2008).
Panel A estimates are obtained from 2SLS regression: log(zit) = e · log(1 − τit) + α · 1(top 1 percent) + β · 1(post- 
reform) + εit using 1(top 1 percent) · 1(post-reform year) as instrument. Time controls in the last row of panel A2 are 
group specific: γ1 · t · 1(top 1 percent) + γ2 · t · 1(not top 1 percent). Panel B1 estimates are obtained from 2SLS panel 
regression: ∆log(zit) = e · ∆log(1 − τit) + εit using 1(top 1 percent in base year) as instrument. Base year income 
controls log(zit) and 10 splines in zit are added in last two rows. In panel B2, comparisons 1991 to 1992, . . . , 1996 to 
1997 are stacked and year dummies are included in the 2SLS regression. The instrument is 1(top 1 percent in base 
year) · 1(t = 1992). Instrument MTR predicted change log[(1 − τ pit)/ (1 − τit)] is used in the 4th row of estimates 
where τ pit is the marginal tax rate in year t + 1 using (inflation adjusted) year t income. In column 1, the estimates 
are run using the top 10 percent tax filers (so that the treatment group is the top 1 percent and the control group is 
the top 10 percent excluding the top 1 percent, “The next 9 percent”). In column 2, the estimates are run using the 
top 50 percent tax filers (so that the control group is the top 50 percent excluding the top 1 percent, “The next 49 
percent”).
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1991 to 1994 generates a negative  elasticity, 
as the top 1 percent incomes increased 
faster than the next 9 percent incomes from 
1991 to 1994 (figure 1). The sign switch 
mirrors the results of table 1, column 1.49 
As is standard in the case of difference-
in-differences estimation, formula (17) will 
yield an unbiased estimate of the elasticity e 
only if the  parallel trend assumption holds: 
absent the tax change, the numerator would 
have been zero, i.e., log-income changes 
pre- to post-reform would have been the 
same in the treatment and control groups. 
In the case of our example, that means that 
the incomes of the top 1 percent would have 
grown at the same rate as the incomes of 
the next 9 percent (absent the tax change). 
Such an assumption can be examined using 
pre-reform years or post-reform years to 
construct placebo  difference-in-differences 
estimates. As is clear from figure 1, the top 1 
percent incomes increase sharply from 1994 
to 2000 relative to average incomes, while the 
share of the next 9 percent income is almost 
flat. Therefore, the difference-in-differences 
identification assumption is clearly violated in 
the  post-reform period.
In cases where the parallel trend assump-
tion does not hold, we can generalize equation 
(16) by pooling together several pre-reform 
years and post-reform years and running the 
following two-stage-least-squares regression 




49  Estimates from table 2, panel A, are unweighted 
(i.e., not weighted by income,  z it ). In a previous version of 
this paper (Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2009), similar esti-
mates are presented when weighting by income. Income-
weighting is standard in the ETI literature because it gives 
proportionally more weight to high-income taxpayers, 
because their response contributes proportionately more 
to the aggregate elasticity (as discussed in section 2.1). 
Here, cross-sectional estimates are not income-weighted 
because of concerns from weighting by the dependent 
variable. The estimates here are qualitatively similar to the 
earlier income-weighted estimates, however, the absolute 
magnitude of the estimates is smaller, especially for the 
positive estimates reported in rows two and four.
(18) log  z it = e · log(1 −  τ it )
 + α · 1(t ≥  
_
 t)
 + β · 1(i ∈ T) +  γ C · t
 +  γ T · t · 1(i ∈ T) +  ε it ,
where we have added separate time trends 
for the control and treatment groups and 
where the instrument is the post-reform and 
treatment interaction 1(t ≥  
_
 t) · 1(i ∈ T).
As shown in table 2, panel A, with no time 
trends, the regression produces a negative 
elasticity estimate of e = −0.40 because the 
top 1 percent incomes increase faster than 
next 9 percent incomes over the period 1991 
to 1997 in spite of the top tax rate increase. 
However, adding separate time trends gen-
erates a statistically significant and positive 
elasticity estimate of e = 0.47. This positive 
elasticity is consistent with figure 1: from 
1991 to 1997, the share of income reported 
by the top 1 percent incomes increases rela-
tive to the next 9 percent, but from 1992 to 
1993, incomes for the top 1 percent incomes 
fall overall and relative to the next 9 percent 
of the income distribution, coinciding exactly 
with the tax change. Hence, the pooled 
regression (18) assumes that this reversal 
is due to a large immediate and permanent 
elasticity of reported income with respect 
to tax rates. We discuss below the issue of 
short-term versus long-term responses, 
which is central to this particular tax epi-
sode. Column 2 in table 2 shows that those 
repeated cross-section estimates are not sen-
sitive to broadening the control group from 
the next 9 percent to the next 49 percent, 
because incomes for both the next 9 per-
cent and the next 49 percent move together, 
exhibiting very slow growth over the period.
Finally, note that if the control group 
faces a tax change, difference-in-differences 
estimates will be consistent only if the elas-
ticities are the same for the two groups. 
To see this, refer back to equation (17). 
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Suppose that the control group experi-
ences a change in tax rates that is half the 
size of the tax rate change for the treat-
ment group, so that E(log(1 −  τ i t 1  ) | C) − 
E(log(1 −  τ i t 0  ) | C) = 0.5 · [E(log(1 −  τ i t 1  ) | T) − 
E(log(1 −  τ i t 0  ) | T)]. Assume further that the dif-
ference-in-differences identification assump-
tion holds, but that the elasticity in the control 
group is zero while the elasticity is  e T > 0 in 
the treatment group. In that case, we have
E(log  z i t 1  | T) −E(log  z i t 0  | T)
=  e T · [E(log(1 −  τ i t 1  ) | T) − E(log(1 −  τ i t 0  ) | T)
and E(log  z i t 1  | C) − E(log  z i t 0  | C) = 0 and 
hence formula (17) leads to e = 2 ·  e T : the 
estimated elasticity is twice as large as the true 
elasticity in the treatment group. This possi-
bility might be relevant for interpreting the 
effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986; table 
1 shows that, based on share elasticities, the 
elasticity around that episode may be large 
for the top 1 percent, but close to zero for the 
next 9 percent (and the next 9 percent experi-
ences a tax rate cut that is about half of the 
tax rate cut for the top 1 percent from 1986 to 
1988). This may partly explain why Feldstein 
(1995) obtained such large elasticities around 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a point made 
originally by John Navratil (1995).
3.4.2 Panel Analysis
Following the influential analysis of 
Feldstein (1995), the great majority of empir-
ical studies of the ETI have used panel data. 
With panel data, we can define the treat-
ment group T as the top 1 percent of income 
earners and the control group C as the next 
9 percent of tax filers based on income in 
 pre-reform year  t 0 , and follow those tax filers 
into the post-reform year  t 1 . We can then run 
the two-stage-least-squares panel regression: 
(19) log  
 z i t 1   _ z i t 0  
 = e · log ( 1 −  τ i t 1   _1 −  τ i t 0   ) +  ε it ,
using 1(i ∈ T) as the instrument. This regres-
sion estimates a difference-in-differences 
parameter: 
(20) e =  
E(log   z i t 1   _ z i t 0   | T) − E(log  
 z i t 1   _ z i t 0   | C)   _  
 E[log (  1−τ i t 1   _ 1−τ i t 0   )| T] − E[log ( 
 1−τ i t 1   _
 1−τ i t 0  
 )| C]  .
As shown in table 2, panel B, such a regres-
sion generates a very large elasticity of 1.40, 
as the top 1 percent income earners in 1992 
experience a drop in reported taxable income 
of about 15 percent in 1993, while the next 9 
percent income earners in 1992 experience a 
drop of less than 5 percent. As noted above, 
this elasticity estimate is unbiased if, absent the 
tax change, the numerator of (19) is zero: log 
income changes are the same in the treatment 
and control group. As we described in our 
discussion of repeated cross-section analyses, 
this assumption might be violated if there are 
secular changes in income inequality: the top 
1 percent incomes might have increased faster 
than the next 9 percent earners even in the 
absence of a tax change. In the case of panel 
analysis, however, another problem arises. 
Even in the absence of changes in the income 
distribution, the identification assumption 
might not hold because of mean reversion: the 
top 1 percent incomes in base year  t 0 are likely 
to decrease because many individuals were in 
the top 1 percent in year  t 0 due to having large 
positive transitory incomes.
To mitigate the mean reversion bias as 
well as potential changes in income inequal-
ity, following Auten and Carroll (1999), one 
can add year  t 0 income controls in regres-
sion (20), either in a simple way by includ-
ing log  z i t 0  , or in a richer way by including 
either polynomials or splines in base-year 
income.50 As shown in table 2, adding such 
50  Decile-based splines are a set of ten variables. The 
p-th spline is constant outside decile p (of the distribution 
of log income) and varies like log income within the p-th 
decile.
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income controls has a dramatic effect on the 
estimates: the estimated elasticities become 
negative with large absolute values and large 
standard errors.51 
With only two years of data, adding too 
many base-year income controls destroys 
identification by absorbing much of the 
independent variation in tax rates, as the tax-
rate instrument—a dummy for those with 
incomes in the top 1 percent in the base 
year—is also a function of base-year income. 
Therefore, we are skeptical that convincing 
estimates of the ETI can be obtained from 
a panel analysis using only two years of data 
when the tax rate changes are concentrated 
in a single part of the distribution (such as 
the top percentile in our example).
To overcome this issue, one would want 
to assess whether the numerator of (20) is 
uniquely large when a tax reform happens 
(relative to times when no tax reform hap-
pens). Therefore, following Gruber and 
Saez (2002), we can add additional years in 
regression (20) by stacking differences for 
years 1991 to 1992, 1992 to 1993, . . ., 1996 
to 1997, and adding year dummies as 
follows: 
(21) log  
 z it+1  _ z it   = e · log ( 1 −  τ it+1  _1 −  τ it   )
 + f ( z it ) +  α t +  ε it , 
where f ( z it ) denotes controls in base-year 
income. In that case, we use as an instrument 
1(i ∈  T t ) · 1(t = 1992), i.e., the interaction of 
being in the top 1 percent in the base year 
and the tax reform year 1992. Table 2 shows 
that, compared to the elasticity estimate of 
1.395 with no base-year income controls, 
the estimate falls to around 0.5 to 0.6 when 
51   Adding base-year income controls in the 1991 to 
1994 comparison also makes the elasticity estimates nega-
tive and very imprecisely estimated.
adding base-year income controls. The key 
identifying assumption in this case is that, 
absent the tax change, the extent of year-to-
year mean reversion and year-to-year income 
inequality changes are stable over the period 
1991 to 1997. Note that the estimates are 
no longer highly sensitive to the number of 
income controls (and, as the income con-
trols f ( z it ) are not year-specific, they do not 
destroy the identification).
Additional Issues in Panel Analysis
A troubling issue with panel analysis 
(relative to repeated cross-section analysis) 
is that the identification assumptions lack 
transparency because they mix assumptions 
regarding mean reversion and assumptions 
regarding changes in income inequality. As 
a result, it is not possible to informally assess 
the validity of the panel approach by exam-
ining graphs such as figure 1. When base-
year income controls are added this problem 
becomes even more severe. For example, 
it is often impossible to tell to what extent 
the income controls are adjusting for mean 
reversion and to what extent they are con-
trolling for divergence in the income dis-
tribution. Worse yet, these income controls 
could hamper identification by absorbing 
informative variation in the tax rates, which 
are correlated with income. Our empirical 
analysis also reveals considerable sensitivity 
of panel regressions even in the case where 
many years are pooled and many base-year 
income controls are included (as in table 2, 
panel B2).
First, comparing columns 1 and 2 on 
table 2, panel B2, we note that the panel-
based estimates are somewhat sensitive to 
the choice of the control group, probably 
due to differences in mean reversion across 
control groups. Therefore, in situations with 
mean reversion, it is useful to include epi-
sodes of both increases and decreases in tax 
rates for identification, as mean reversion 
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creates biases in opposite directions in the 
case of tax increases versus tax decreases.
Second, the panel regressions are sensi-
tive to the choice of the instrument for the 
marginal tax rate. We have so far defined the 
instrument based on membership in the top 
1 percent group to exploit the fact that the 
1993 tax change was concentrated among 
the top 1 percent. However, to account for 
tax schedule changes throughout the income 
distribution, many studies have instead used 
a different instrument: the predicted change 
in log net-of-tax rates assuming that income, 
often inflation-adjusted income, remains the 
same as in the base year (allowing the tax 
schedule to change).52 Such an instrument 
has the advantage of taking account of all 
changes in the tax rate schedule. In the case 
of the 1993 reform, the choice of the instru-
ment should not matter much because the 
tax rate change was concentrated among the 
top 1 percent. However, the elasticity esti-
mates, shown in the fourth row of panel B2, 
are much smaller when using the predicted 
change in the log of the net-of-tax tax rate as 
an instrument. This may be due to the fact 
that predicted marginal tax rate changes are 
sometimes nonzero due to minor changes in 
the tax code or various provisions that are not 
indexed for inflation. If tax filers are unlikely 
to respond to such minor changes, this may 
explain why estimates using the traditional 
instrument are smaller than those using the 
top 1 percent instrument.
Some authors have proposed alternatively 
to construct the instrument based either on 
the average of pre- and post-reform income 
(Carroll 1998) or on income in a year mid-
way between the years used to construct 
52  We estimated the predicted marginal tax rate in 
year t + 1 by inflating year t incomes using the inflation 
adjustment used in the tax code. As a result, only statutory 
changes in the tax law such as the top rate reduction in 
1993 or elements of the tax code that are not indexed can 
produce a change in predicted net-of-tax rates.
the  difference (Blomquist and Selin 2009).53 
While using average income helps with mean 
reversion, changes in the distribution of 
income remain a potential issue. Practically, 
empirical attempts at using such alternative 
instruments have shown that estimates are 
quite sensitive to the choice of instruments, 
suggesting that the standard methods do not 
control adequately for mean reversion.
Advantages of Panel Analysis
Under some assumptions, panel analysis 
offers several advantages. First, in principle, 
panel analysis is useful (relative to repeated 
cross-section analysis) if individual income 
in a base year is a good predictor of income 
after the reform (absent any tax change). This 
is restating in a positive way the point that 
the presence of income mobility weakens the 
case for using panel data.54 In reality, there is 
substantial persistence of individual income 
from year to year and therefore panel esti-
mates tend to have smaller standard errors 
than repeated cross-section estimates (keep-
ing sample size the same). In practice, this 
advantage is counterbalanced by the fact that 
there is a non-negligible fraction of individu-
als who experience very substantial mobility 
and—based on our computations—can have 
a significant influence on panel estimates, so 
that some trimming of outliers is needed to 
obtain more stable estimates.
Second, panel analysis is also useful when 
one wants to analyze a tax change targeted to 
a specific group and there is a concern that 
53 Caroline Weber (2010) argues for constructing the 
tax rate instrument to be a function of income lagged one 
or more years before the base year, with the appropriate 
lag depending on the degree of serial correlation of transi-
tory income; in this framework, addressing heterogeneous 
income trends requires that one-year income controls be 
instrumented with income from the same lag as for the tax 
rate variables.
54 To see this, note that in the extreme case where 
potential incomes  z it 0 are iid, there would be no point in 
using panel data.
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the composition of this group will change 
significantly over time in the repeated cross 
sections. Consider again the case of the 1993 
reform, which affected the top 1 percent 
income earners. Suppose that the increase 
in the top 1 percent income share is due 
entirely to new tax filers who entered the 
high-income category in 1993 for reasons 
unrelated to the tax change and who were 
not part of the control group either (e.g., a 
student starting a successful new dot-com 
company), and that neither the top 1 percent 
income earners nor the next 9 percent con-
trol group in 1992 experienced any change in 
income (absent the tax change). In that case, 
the repeated cross-section analysis is biased 
because of composition effects (that change 
the cross-section distribution of income for 
nontax reasons), but the panel analysis is 
unbiased because (1) there is no mean rever-
sion among the 1992 top 1 percent income 
earners relative to the control group and (2) 
there is no change in inequality from 1992 to 
1993 between the top 1 percent and the con-
trol group defined based on 1992 incomes. 
Obviously these two assumptions never hold 
exactly, as there is substantial mobility with 
respect to the top 1 percent. For example, 
Slemrod (1992) reports that, in the 1980s, 
between 28 and 40 percent of the households 
in the top 1 percent of the income distribu-
tion were new from one year to the next.
Finally, panel data are required to study 
some questions other than the overall 
response of reported incomes. For example, 
if one wants to study how a tax change affects 
income mobility (for example, do more 
middle-income individuals become success-
ful entrepreneurs following a tax rate cut?), 
panel data is clearly necessary.
In sum, those considerations lead us to 
conclude that the advantage of longitudinal 
analysis relative to repeated cross-section 
analysis has been somewhat exaggerated in 
the empirical literature following Feldstein 
(1995), especially when one wants to analyze 
tax changes happening primarily at the top 
of the income distribution. In some contexts, 
repeated cross-section analysis or share-
based time-series analysis may be a more 
robust and transparent approach.55 
3.4.3 Short-Term versus Long-Term 
 Responses
Figure 1 illustrates the difficulty of obtain-
ing convincing estimates of the (short- and 
long-term) elasticity of reported income 
with respect to the net-of-tax rate. As already 
discussed, the anticipated high-end tax rate 
increases of 1993 seem to have generated a 
temporary decline in top 1 percent incomes 
in 1993 and a temporary upward spike in 
1992 as tax filers moved reported taxable 
income from 1993 into 1992 to take advan-
tage of the lower 1992 tax rate. As a result, the 
elasticity estimated using only the years 1992 
and 1993 is large. We know something about 
the nature of this short-term response. For 
executives, Goolsbee (2000b) showed that 
indeed a significant fraction of the response 
was due to timing in the realization of stock 
options, and Parcell (1995) and Sammartino 
and Weiner (1997) document the extent of 
year-end retiming of taxable income in the 
form of bonuses. In these cases, we would 
expect the long-term response to be much 
smaller.
An important question is whether the 
clearly visible short-term responses per-
sist over time. In particular, how should we 
interpret the continuing rise in top incomes 
after 1994? If one thinks that this surge is 
evidence of diverging trends between high-
income individuals and the rest of the popu-
lation that are independent of tax policy, then 
the long-term response to the tax change is 
less than estimated. Alternatively, one could 
55 Obviously, access to panel data is never worse than 
access to repeated cross-sectional data, as it is always pos-
sible to ignore the longitudinal aspect of panel data and 
carry out a repeated cross-section analysis with panel data.
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argue that the surge in top incomes since the 
mid-1990s was the long-term consequence 
of the decrease in tax rates in the 1980s, and 
that such a surge would not have occurred 
had high-income tax rates remained as high 
as they were in the 1960s and 1970s. It is, 
though, very difficult to disentangle those 
various scenarios with a single time series of 
top incomes and top tax rates. As mentioned 
above, cross-country time-series analysis 
might be a fruitful area to make progress, 
taking advantage of varying time patterns of 
tax rate changes.
The literature on capital gains realizations 
has developed dynamic micro-econometrics 
models to estimate simultaneously short-
term and long-term responses to tax changes 
(see e.g., Burman and Randolph 1994). In the 
case of the ETI, such explicit modeling has 
only been used in a few studies (Holmlund 
and Söderström 2008, Giertz 2010, and 
Heim 2007 and 2009). These papers aug-
ment the traditional panel specification (21) 
by adding a lagged change in the marginal 
tax rate term and sometimes a prospective 
rate change term. If some components of 
taxable income respond with a one-year lag 
then, in principle, the lagged term will cap-
ture this effect; a future tax rate term could 
pick up timing responses to anticipated tax 
rate changes. This method could be useful to 
disentangle short-term from medium-term 
responses, although obtaining compelling 
identification is difficult.
3.4.4 Alternative Control Groups
The tax code offers some possibilities 
to generate alternative control groups that 
might be more comparable to treatment 
groups than the income-based control groups 
used in the analyses discussed heretofore. 
For example, inflation (before the inflation 
adjustment of the U.S. income tax sched-
ule after the Tax Reform Act of 1986) or the 
loss of a personal exemption can also push 
 taxpayers into a higher bracket, and in some 
cases married and unmarried couples experi-
ence different changes in their tax schedules. 
Those changes have been explored by Saez 
(2003), Looney and Singhal (2006), Singleton 
(2011), and Feldman and Katuscak (2009). 
The advantage of studying those changes is 
that one can compare taxpayers who are very 
similar both in income and initial marginal 
tax rate—but yet face different prospects for 
changes in marginal tax rates—and hence 
potentially make a much more convincing 
case for identification.
The main drawback of this strategy is that 
taxpayers may not be aware of the minute 
details of the tax code, and hence might not 
respond to very localized changes in their 
marginal tax rate situation. As a result, elas-
ticities obtained from those studies might not 
be relevant to predict behavioral responses 
to well-advertised, more salient, and broader 
tax rate changes. This lack of perfect infor-
mation might also explain why there does 
not appear to be significant bunching at the 
kink points of the tax schedule (Saez 2010) 
as predicted in the standard model.56 Chetty 
et al. (2011) use Danish tax return data and 
show that large kinks generate dispropor-
tionately stronger bunching responses than 
small kinks, consistent with the hypothesis 
that tax filers do not pay as much attention to 
small tax changes as they do to large changes. 
As a result, elasticities estimated from large 
changes may be larger than elasticities esti-
mated from small changes, an important 
point formally developed in Chetty (2009c). 
More generally, to the extent that informa-
tional considerations are a central aspect 
of the size of the behavioral response, it is 
important to develop models of how and 
when individuals learn about their budget 
set and to consider the consequences of the 
56  Chetty and Saez (2009) show that providing informa-
tion to EITC recipients does produce changes in subse-
quent reported incomes, indicating that tax filers do not 
have perfect information about the tax system.
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learning process for the optimal design of tax 
and transfer policies. Tax response analysis 
thus faces this fundamental tension: large 
reforms are the most likely to be noticed and 
understood by taxpayers, but often do not 
generate fully convincing control groups for 
identification. Small reforms or quirks in the 
tax code can generate better control groups, 
but might not lead to meaningful, general-
izable estimates if most taxpayers are not 
aware of such tax changes or provisions.57 
3.4.5 Tax Base Changes
Although estimation of the ETI focuses 
on changes in the schedule of tax rates, the 
definition of the tax base subject to the rate 
schedule also changes periodically, often at 
the same time the rates change as part of 
comprehensive tax reform legislation. This 
raises a number of issues that are especially 
important when, as in the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986, multiple tax base changes accom-
panied the tax rate changes, and are much 
less important in cases like the 1993 change, 
when the top marginal tax rate changed 
with little base definition change. That 
income tax rates changes often coincide 
with changes in the definition of taxable 
income is not a coincidence, because the 
theme of many income tax reforms since 
the 1980s has been to broaden the tax base 
and lower the rates applied to the base in a 
revenue-neutral way.
Identifying the taxable income elasticity 
when both the tax base and tax rates change 
becomes problematic because the taxable 
income elasticity is plausibly different in 
the post-reform era compared to the pre-
reform era. For example, the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 broadened the tax base by both 
reducing deductions and the  attractiveness 
of tax “shelters.” It is likely that, due to these 
57  Chetty (2009a) develops an econometric method to 
set bounds on elasticities when responses are incomplete 
due to lack of awareness of taxpayers.
changes, the taxable income elasticity post-
1986 was lower than pre-1986, as docu-
mented by Kopczuk (2005). In this situation 
even an otherwise well-specified estimation 
strategy will yield an estimate of neither the 
pre- nor post-reform elasticity, but rather 
a weighted average of the two, where the 
weights need not be positive.
Second, when the definition of the tax base 
changes, using as the dependent variable a 
concurrent definition of taxable income runs 
the risk of confounding tax-induced changes 
in behavior with purely definitional changes. 
For example, the base broadening of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 would, ceteris paribus, 
show taxable incomes to have increased, per-
haps to different degrees at different income 
levels.58 This problem suggests using either 
a consistent pre- or post-reform definition.59 
When the issue is changing deductions or 
credits, for data availability reasons it is gen-
erally easier to use the broader definition 
(i.e., not net of the deductions), because 
otherwise the investigator needs, but will 
not have, measures of deductions or cred-
its that are not reported in the year with the 
broader base; the argument is reversed when 
new sources of income are added to the tax 
base. Because the former type of broadening 
was more prevalent, those studying the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 have attempted to ana-
lyze a post-1986 definition of taxable income; 
this cannot, though, be done in a completely 
satisfactory manner.
58 This is why Slemrod (1996) adjusted downward the 
post-1986 Feenberg and Poterba (1993) measures of the 
high-income shares; otherwise, the change from including 
40 percent of capital gains in taxable income in the years up 
to 1986 to 100 percent inclusion afterward would increase 
the measured high-income share even in the absence of 
any behavioral response because capital gains comprise a 
disproportionately high fraction of income for high-income 
people.
59  Alternatively one could, like Kopczuk (2005), employ 
a model where independent variables account for changes 
to the tax base.
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Even if a consistent measure of taxable 
income could be constructed, the choice 
of which constant-law definition of taxable 
income to use is by no means an innocuous 
one.60 If the objective is to estimate the leak-
age from a given base when the rate of tax 
is altered, either method has problems. As 
discussed in Auerbach and Slemrod (1997), 
the response to a reform that changes both 
the marginal tax rate and the tax base does 
not, without further assumptions, reveal the 
impact of a tax change for a given base. If the 
broader definition of taxable income is used, 
the measured response mixes two things: the 
response of the old base to an increase in the 
net-of-tax rate, and the response of the newly 
included base to a decrease in the net-of-tax 
rate. On the other hand, the response of the 
pre-reform base will probably overestimate 
the partial elasticity of the base with respect 
to a change in the tax rate. Using a consistent 
post-reform definition will produce a change 
in taxable income that is less than what is 
obtained using the pre-reform definition.
3.5 Multiple Tax Rates: The Special Case of 
Capital Gains Realizations
Another complicating factor is capi-
tal gains. Although real accrued gains are 
income according to the Haig-Simons defi-
nition, those countries that tax capital gains 
at all do so upon realization (usually sale), 
and those countries that do tax realizations 
now generally subject them to a lower rate 
than applies to other income. In the United 
States, the extent of preferential tax has var-
ied significantly since 1980. Before the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, 40 percent of long-
term gains were included in taxable income; 
with a top rate of 50 percent, the top rate 
on realizations was 20 percent. When the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 lowered the top rate to 
60  An exception would arise if the elasticity of substitu-
tion between activities whose tax status changes and those 
whose status does not change equals zero (Heim 2007).
28 percent, the exclusion was eliminated, so 
that the top rate on long-term capital gains 
was also 28 percent. Since 1986, the top rate 
on ordinary income has risen and a preferen-
tial rate has been reintroduced; since 2003, 
the two rates have been 35 percent and 15 
percent, respectively.
Almost all studies of the ETI in the United 
States have excluded capital gains realiza-
tions from the measure of taxable income 
or broad income, on the reasonable grounds 
that they are generally subject to a different 
marginal tax rate than other income. It is also 
true that they are especially responsive to 
anticipated changes in the applicable tax rate. 
(See Burman, Clausing, and O’Hare 1994). 
However, ignoring capital gains completely 
raises some difficult issues. As background, 
in the United States, they constitute a very 
large fraction of the taxable income of the 
top income groups.61 Second, they fluctuate 
year-to-year much more than other income, 
both in the aggregate and, especially, for 
given taxpayers, generating significant year-
to-year mobility in and out of the top 1 per-
cent income group (capital gains included).
Some taxpayers have opportunities for 
converting wage and salary income to capi-
tal gains income—and these opportunities 
are exercised when the tax advantages of so 
doing are sufficient. Because the tax advan-
tage depends on the differential between the 
rate on ordinary income and capital gains, 
this rate matters and should ideally be con-
trolled for in analyses of how the tax rate on 
ordinary income affects the reported amount 
of ordinary income. Furthermore, convert-
ing ordinary income to capital gains income 
often is accompanied by deferral of the real-
ization of the latter for tax purposes, so the 
61   In 2005, for example, for taxpayers with AGI exceed-
ing $500,000, who represent just less than 1 percent of all 
taxable returns, taxable net capital gain comprised 33.3 
percent of AGI, compared to 3.8 percent of AGI for all 
other taxable returns.
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offsetting revenue may not come for several 
years, if ever.
Another issue is that, in microeconometric 
analysis, the standard procedure is to calcu-
late the marginal tax rate on ordinary income 
assuming no capital gains income. This would 
be appropriate if decisions that trigger ordi-
nary income were made before decisions 
regarding capital gains realizations, but this 
is unrealistic and thus this procedure causes 
error in measuring the actual MTR. The 
same issues arise in share analysis. Slemrod 
(1996) includes capital gains in his measure 
of adjusted gross income, and includes as 
explanatory variables the top rates on both 
ordinary income and capital gains. He finds 
no evidence that a higher capital gains tax 
rate is associated with a higher share of wages 
and salaries, though. Ideally, one would need 
a model of joint determination of capital 
gains and ordinary income as a function of 
the marginal tax rates on capital gains and 
ordinary income in the general methodology 
of the elasticity of taxable income.
3.6 Income Shifting: The Anatomy of 
Behavioral Responses
We have argued that estimating taxable 
income elasticities in a fully convincing way 
is challenging because of the difficulty of 
untangling tax-related from non-tax-related 
changes in reported incomes. Furthermore, 
our conceptual analysis in section 2 showed 
that, in addition to measuring the reported 
taxable income elasticity, to obtain a wel-
fare-relevant elasticity it may be important 
to assess fiscal externalities. A way to make 
progress on those two issues is to analyze 
the “anatomy of the behavioral response” 
(Slemrod 1996) by examining the compo-
nents of reported income.
Figure 2 (updated from Saez 2004b) dis-
plays the share and composition of the top 
0.01 percent of income earners in the United 
States since 1960 along with the average mar-
ginal tax rate they faced (in bold line on the 
right y-axis). We focus on this very top group 
because tax rate changes and tax responses 
are arguably the strongest and most salient at 
the very top. The figure divides income into 
seven income components: (1) wages and sal-
aries (which include bonuses and profits from 
qualified exercised stock options), (2) divi-
dends, (3) interest income, (4) sole proprietor-
ship profits (profits from small businesses that 
are fully owned by the taxpayer, this includes 
most forms of self-employment income), (5) 
partnership profits (profits from businesses 
where the taxpayer is a partner such as a law 
or medical practice partnership), (6) profits 
from subchapter S corporations (taxed solely 
at the individual level), and (7) other income.
Four points are worth noting about fig-
ure 2. First, the top 0.01 percent income 
earners faced extremely high marginal tax 
rates in the early 1960s (around 80 per-
cent) that were reduced significantly by the 
Kennedy tax cuts in 1964–65 (to about 65 
percent). This implies a 75 percent increase 
in the net-of-tax rate, a much larger increase 
than either the 1981 tax cuts and the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 tax rate reductions. In 
spite of this large rate cut, the top 0.01 per-
cent income share remains flat in the 1960s, 
and well into the 1970s, suggesting little 
behavioral response in both the short and the 
long run. This stands in contrast to the sharp 
response of the top 0.01 percent income 
share to the 1981 and 1986 tax changes, 
consistent with the view that the elasticity 
is not an immutable parameter, but instead 
depends on the tax system.
Second, figure 2 shows clearly that about 
one-third of the response to the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 from 1986 to 1988 was due to a 
surge in S-corporation income.62 Partnership 
62 The 1981 tax act also produced a sudden increase of 
S-corporation income (which was negligible up to 1981), 
which explains most of the increase in top incomes from 
1981 to 1984 first documented by Lawrence B. Lindsey 
(1987).
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income also rose dramatically immediately 
after 1986, mostly because of the disappear-
ance of partnership losses. The sudden jump 
in S-corporation income, exactly at the time 
of the tax reform, strongly suggests that this 
was the consequence of a one-time shift of 
taxable income from the corporate sector, 
and the one-time closing of the partnership 
loss tax shelters (Slemrod 1996, Gordon and 
Slemrod 2000). The surge in business income 
reported on individual returns in the 1980s 
thus cannot be interpreted as a “supply-side” 
success, as most of those individual income 
gains came either at the expense of taxable 
corporate income, or were obtained from the 
closing of tax shelters by imposing stricter 
rules on losses from passive businesses.
Third, figure 2 displays a dramatic shift in 
the composition of very top incomes away 
from dividends (which represented more than 
60 percent of top incomes in the early 1960s) 
toward wage income and S-corporation and 
partnership income. In the early 1960s, when 
the top 0.01 percent incomes were facing 
marginal tax rates of about 80 percent on 
average, tax rates on long-term capital gains 
were around 25 percent. Thus, dividends 
were a very disadvantaged form of income 
for the rich, suggesting that those top income 
earners had little control over the form of 
payment, and thus might have been in large 
part passive investors. The Kennedy tax cuts 
apparently did not reduce the top individual 









































































































Figure 2. The Top 0.01 Percent U.S. Income Share, Composition, and Marginal Tax Rate, 1960–2006
Source: Updated version of figure 8 in Saez (2004). Computations based on income tax return data.
The figure displays the income share of the top .01 percent tax units, and how the top .01 percent incomes are 
divided into seven income components: wages and salaries (including exercised stock options), S-corporation profits, 
partnership profits, sole proprietorship profits, dividends, interest income, and other income. The figure also dis-
plays the average marginal tax rate (weighted by income) for the top 0.01 percent in a bold line on the right y-axis.
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to make the S-corporation form attractive 
relative to the C-corporation form, explaining 
perhaps the contrast in behavioral responses 
between the Kennedy tax cuts episodes and 
the tax changes of the 1980s. Interestingly, 
figure 2 also displays an increase in the divi-
dend income component after 2003, when 
the tax rate on dividend income was lowered 
to 15 percent.63 
Fourth, and related, the wage income 
component of the top 0.01 percent has expe-
rienced a dramatic secular growth since 
the 1970s. The wage component exhibits 
clear spikes in 1988 and 1992, which are 
likely to reflect short-term responses to the 
tax changes due to retiming of compensa-
tion.64 The difficult question to resolve is to 
what extent the secular growth in top wage 
incomes was due to the dramatic decline in 
top marginal tax rates since the 1960s. This 
question cannot be resolved solely looking at 
U.S. evidence. Evidence from other coun-
tries on the pattern of top incomes and top 
tax rates (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011) 
suggests that reducing top tax rates to lev-
els below 50 percent is a necessary—but not 
sufficient—condition to produce a surge in 
top incomes. Countries such as the United 
States or the United Kingdom have expe-
rienced both a dramatic reduction in top 
tax rates and a surge in top incomes (Mike 
Brewer, Saez, and Andrew Shephard 2010), 
while other countries such as Japan have 
also experienced significant declines in top 
tax rates, but no comparable surge in top 
incomes over recent decades (Moriguchi 
and Saez 2008).
63  This is consistent with the firm-based analysis of 
Chetty and Saez (2005), who show that dividends paid out 
by publicly traded U.S. companies rose sharply after the 
dividend tax cut was enacted.
64   There is also a very large spike in 2000 that is likely 
due to the boom and bust in the dot-com sector, where 
stock-option exercises, which generally generate income 
classified as wages, peaked in 2000 before collapsing in 
2001 and 2002.
Overall, the compositional graph dis-
played on figure 2 casts significant light on 
the anatomy of the behavioral response 
and helps to distinguish short-term from 
long-term effects, as well as effects due to 
income shifting from the corporate base to 
the individual base or due to tighter regula-
tions regarding business losses. Therefore, 
we believe that supplementing the focus on 
the taxable income elasticity with a more 
granular understanding of the various com-
ponents of behavioral responses to taxation 
is fruitful both to predict the effects of future 
tax reforms as well as to analyze the overall 
welfare and fiscal consequences of actual 
tax changes. As this discussion has shown, 
there is compelling evidence of substan-
tial responses of upper income taxpayers to 
changes in tax rates, at least in the short run. 
However, in all cases, the response is either 
due to short-term retiming or income shift-
ing. There is no compelling evidence to date 
of real responses of upper income taxpayers 
to changes in tax rates.
Following the interpretation of Atkinson, 
Piketty, and Saez (2011) in their analysis of 
the evolution of top income shares in the 
long run, it is conceivable that the drop in 
top marginal tax rates since the 1980s could 
lead to more wealth and capital income con-
centration decades later, as top income indi-
viduals can accumulate wealth more easily 
when top tax rates are lower. In this case, the 
surge in the top income share due to capi-
tal income displayed in figure 2 could be the 
long-term consequence of past top tax rate 
cuts. The ETI has not yet developed a frame-
work to analyze such long-term responses 
through the savings and wealth accumula-
tion channels.
4. Empirical Analysis
Since the early 1990s, a large literature has 
sought to estimate the ETI and elasticities 
for related income measures. Most of this 
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 literature on the ETI has focused on indi-
vidual taxable income in the United States, 
although some studies have examined indi-
vidual taxable income in Canada and Western 
Europe. The analyses in the literature vary 
widely in the extent to which they address—
or even attempt to address—the issues dis-
cussed in the previous section. Rather than 
comprehensively survey this literature, in 
what follows we selectively discuss the stud-
ies—focusing on studies that use the type of 
data and empirical approaches most likely 
to yield reliable estimates of the elasticity of 
taxable income or of a broader measure of 
income. We emphasize how, and how well, 
each study addresses the methodological 
issues discussed in the previous section.65 
4.1 Analysis Using Aggregated Time-Series 
Data
Feenberg and Poterba (1993) were the 
first to use aggregate tax return data to shed 
light on the high-income share of reported 
aggregate income in the United States and 
to what extent this might be influenced by 
changes to the tax rate structure. They cal-
culate for 1951 to 1990 the share of AGI 
and several components of AGI that were 
received by the top 0.5 percent of households 
ranked by AGI. Consistent with figure 1, the 
four-decade time series is sharply U-shaped, 
beginning with a steady decline from over 
8 percent in the early 1950s to just below 6 
percent around 1970. Then, after remaining 
roughly flat at about 6.0 percent from 1970 
to 1981, the high-income share of income 
begins in 1982 to continuously increase to 
7.7 percent in 1985, then jumps sharply in 
1986 to 9.2 percent. There is a slight increase 
in 1987 to 9.5 percent, then another sharp 
increase in 1988 to 12.1 percent. Although 
they conduct no formal analysis of the  dataset 
65  The working paper version of this paper (Saez, 
Slemrod, and Giertz 2009) contains a narrative description 
of a wider set of studies.
they  construct, Feenberg and Poterba (1993) 
argue that this time-series pattern is consis-
tent with a behavioral response to the reduc-
tions in the top marginal tax rate, especially 
during the Tax Reform Act of 1986 episode.
Slemrod (1996) uses high-income share 
data for 1954 to 199066 to examine in a 
regression framework the tax and nontax 
causes of inequality. The data up to 1986 are 
taken directly from Feenberg and Poterba 
(1993), but the data from 1987 to 1990 are 
adjusted to correspond to a pre-Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 definition of AGI so as to get 
closer to a consistent (or constant-law) defi-
nition over time. Dependent variables stud-
ied include the high-income share of AGI 
and four components of income. Explanatory 
variables in the regressions include measures 
of the contemporaneous, one-year-lagged, 
and one-year-leading top tax rates for both 
ordinary individual income and long-term 
capital gains. To control for exogenous, non-
tax-related, income trends, Slemrod includes 
a measure of earnings inequality between 
the 90th and 10th percentiles not based on 
tax return data as well as macroeconomic 
variables that might differentially influence 
incomes across the income distribution (e.g., 
the real level of stock prices and the aver-
age nominal corporate AAA bond rate). 
Regressions are estimated using data up to 
1985 and then again using data up to 1990 to 
investigate whether or not there was a break 
in the structure of the model in 1986. The 
analysis reveals that, up to 1985, changes in 
the top tax rate on individual income play 
almost no role in explaining the variation 
in the high-income share of AGI; indeed, 
more than two-fifths of the increase in high-
income share between 1973 and 1985 can be 
associated with the increase in 90–10 wage 
inequality. However, when data up to 1990 
66   Slemrod examines both the top 0.5 percent as well 
as the top 1 percent of taxpayers, although all regressions 
exclusively use the top 0.5 percent.
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are included in the regression, the coeffi-
cient on the top tax rate term becomes large 
in absolute value and statistically significant.
After analyzing different components 
of AGI, including wages and salaries, 
Subchapter S income, and partnership 
income, Slemrod (1996) concludes that the 
regression results are likely driven by the 
changes to the structure of the tax base insti-
tuted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This 
new structure provided very different incen-
tives and opportunities for high-income indi-
viduals to report income (and losses) via the 
individual tax system. He cautions that the 
results do not necessarily imply that taxpayer 
responses to marginal tax rates, holding the 
tax structure constant, were higher post-
1986. Instead the tax rate variables, which 
changed dramatically at the same time the 
structure changed, may be picking up some 
of the effect of this structural change.67 
Because of the simultaneity of the tax rate 
changes and scores of tax base changes, the 
high tax rate elasticity estimated over the 
sample up to 1990 is not an unbiased esti-
mate of the true elasticity, either before or 
after the reform.
Saez (2004b) examines IRS data from 
1960 to 2000. He regresses the log of average 
income for the top 1 percent of the distribu-
tion on the log of the average net-of-tax rate 
for the top 1 percent over the time period 
and finds large elasticities, even when includ-
ing time trends or instrumenting the log net-
of-tax rate using the statutory top marginal 
tax rate. Saez (2004b) goes on to investigate 
which categories of income drive the over-
all response, primarily to ascertain to what 
extent the estimated ETIs reflect income 
shifting. He, like Slemrod (1996), finds a 
break in the series following the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986. When he examines categories of 
gross income, he finds that income shifting 
67  Don Fullerton (1996), in a comment on Slemrod 
(1996), emphasizes this interpretation.
can explain most of the rise in Subchapter 
S and partnership income. What remains 
unclear is whether any portion of the post-
1986 wage and salary growth is attributable 
to the decline in marginal tax rates, is sim-
ply another form of income shifting, or is the 
consequence of non-tax-related widening of 
the earnings distribution.
4.2 Analysis Using Panel Data
Feldstein (1995) pioneered the use of 
panel data to estimate the ETI for the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 by using the U.S. pub-
lic-use panel tax data (see Appendix B.1). 
He groups taxpayers by their 1985 marginal 
tax rates and uses a tabulated difference-
in-differences methodology to estimate 
the ETI with respect to the net-of-tax rate. 
Specifically, to compute elasticities, the dif-
ference in the percent change in taxable 
income (in 1988, relative to adjusted 1985 
income) between two groups is divided by the 
difference in the percent change in the aver-
age net-of-tax-rate between the two groups. 
This method generates large ETI estimates, 
ranging from 1 to 3 in alternative specifica-
tions. Although based on a much smaller 
sample (Feldstein’s top group included only 
fifty-seven tax returns), the Feldstein (1995) 
results apparently corroborated the conclu-
sion of Feenberg and Poterba (1993) based 
on observing the time-series of share-of-
income data that something extraordinary 
had happened to the dispersion of taxable 
income at the same time as the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986.
Subsequent research using panel data 
addresses the econometric issues raised 
earlier in this paper such as mean rever-
sion or secular income trends. Auten and 
Carroll (1999) address mean reversion and 
attempt to control for divergence within the 
income distribution by including control 
variables for region and occupation. Auten 
and Carroll adopt a two-stage least-squares 
regression approach, regressing the change 
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in constant-law (log) AGI68 between 1985 
and 1989 against the change in the log of the 
net-of-tax rate and a set of other exogenous 
variables. They instrument for the change in 
the net-of-tax rate by inflating adjusted 1985 
incomes by the CPI to 1989 levels and then 
applying 1989 law to these incomes, as dis-
cussed in section 3.4.2. When adding non-
tax factors that may have been correlated 
with the rise in income inequality over this 
period (such as age, age-squared, occupa-
tion, region, and—notably—1985 income), 
they report an elasticity estimate of 0.55.
Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) investigate 
behavioral responses to the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986, using panel data from the 1983 and 
1989 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 
instead of income tax return data. Due to 
data limitations, they study an income con-
cept close to AGI rather than taxable income. 
When using Feldstein’s (1995) approach, 
they report tax elasticities for AGI from 1.76 
to 1.99, similar to Feldstein’s taxable income 
elasticity estimates. Moffitt and Wilhelm 
then turn to a two-stage least-squares regres-
sion approach, employing several alternative 
instruments for the change in the net-of-tax 
rate, including education and measures of 
illiquid assets, and conclude that those instru-
ments that are successful in discriminating 
between the high-income group and the 
balance of the population yield tax elasticity 
estimates that range from 0.35 to 0.97. Note 
that these instruments for tax rates are not 
available with individual tax return data. As 
in Auten and Carroll (1999), such estimates 
based on comparing only two years are sensi-
tive to mean reversion. Indeed, when includ-
ing 1983 AGI as a control for mean reversion, 
their elasticities increase by between 0.3 and 
0.5; recall that because the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 reduced top MTRs, mean reversion 
68  The constant-law calculations are based on post-1986 
law. They do a robustness test and find that using pre-1986 
laws does not significantly change the results.
(at the top of the income distribution) biases 
downward estimated ETIs.
Interestingly, because SCF data include 
labor supply measures (hours of work), 
Moffitt and Wilhelm also estimate labor sup-
ply responses and conclude that the surge in 
the taxable income of high-income individuals 
between 1983 and 1989 was not accompanied 
by an increase in reported hours of work. This 
result of no response along a real economic 
margin is fully consistent with the overall 
conclusion that clearly visible responses are 
generally due to retiming or avoidance, with 
no compelling evidence of real economic 
responses. It would certainly be valuable to 
follow upon Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) and 
systematically compare income reporting 
responses to tax changes with real economic 
responses such as labor supply or output.
Gruber and Saez (2002) use the public-
use version of the panel tax data for the 
years 1979 to 1990 to examine both taxable 
income and broad income responses to both 
the 1981 tax change and the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986. Broad income is defined as income 
before deductions. They measure behav-
ioral changes (between paired observations) 
over three-year intervals, which provides 
them with variation in tax rates across time 
for all income levels and a longer period for 
behavioral responses to occur. Furthermore, 
because they incorporate state as well as 
federal income tax changes, they also have 
cross-sectional variations in tax rate changes 
within income groups.
Gruber and Saez devote much attention 
to the issues of mean reversion and secu-
lar income trends, and separately estimate 
income and substitution effects of the tax 
change. They instrument for the change in the 
net-of-tax rate using an instrument very simi-
lar to that used by Auten and Carroll (1999): 
the change in the net-of-tax rate assuming 
each filer’s income grows at the rate of over-
all nominal income growth between the base 
and subsequent year. They also  construct 
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an  analogous instrument for capturing the 
income effect, the log change in after-tax 
income assuming that base year income grows 
at the same rate as total income. The second 
stage regresses the log of (taxable or broad) 
income growth against the change in the log 
of the net-of-tax rate, year fixed effects, and 
dummies for marital status. As they use mul-
tiple years simultaneously, they can include a 
rich set of controls for base income.
Gruber and Saez’s elasticity estimate for 
broad income, 0.12, is notably smaller than 
their corresponding estimate for taxable 
income, suggesting that much of the taxable 
income response comes through deductions, 
exemptions, and exclusions. Consistent with 
this conclusion, they find that most of the 
response in taxable income can be attributed 
to itemizers (for itemizers, the elasticity is 
0.65, whereas for non-itemizers, it is nega-
tive and insignificant). Although estimates by 
income group are not statistically distinguish-
able from each other, they do vary greatly 
and are generally higher for higher-income 
taxpayers (0.57 for people with incomes 
over $100,000, 0.11 for those from $50,000-
$100,000 and 0.18 for those with income 
from $10,000 to $50,000). Importantly, 
Gruber and Saez find much lower elasticities 
for broad income than for taxable income. 
Even for upper income earners, the elastic-
ity of broad income is small (0.17). Those 
findings suggest that the current tax system 
creates significant efficiency costs because of 
its many avoidance opportunities, but that a 
broader income tax base might substantially 
lower the efficiency costs of taxation and 
increase the ability of the government to 
raise taxes from the upper income groups.69 
Kopczuk (2005) investigates the hypothesis 
that the ETI is not a structural parameter, but 
69 Note that even the 0.17 broad income elasticity might 
include responses generating fiscal externalities such as 
income shifting from the corporate to the personal income 
base.
rather a function of the tax base (which he 
defines as taxable income divided by total 
income). The motivating idea is that available 
deductions lower the cost of shifting income 
outside the tax base. Therefore, as the tax base 
narrows, the responsiveness to changes in tax 
rates should increase. After first-differencing 
(he uses three-year intervals, following the 
methodology of Gruber and Saez 2002), he 
follows a two-stage least-squares approach 
with instruments for both the change in the 
log net-of-tax rate and for the interaction of 
that variable with the share of income that is 
deductible. For instruments, he uses the log 
of the predicted changes of these variables, 
absent any behavioral response. Including 
both instrumented changes in marginal tax 
rates and an interaction term between the 
change in tax rate and change in tax base, gen-
erates income-weighted elasticity estimates 
(for married filers) of 0.12 with no deductions 
and 1.06 for the deductible-share interaction 
term. These estimates imply that the roughly 
4.5 percentage point increase in Kopczuk’s 
definition of the tax base as a result of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 would lower the ETI 
by roughly 5 percentage points, from 0.25 to 
0.20. Because itemizers’ deductible share of 
income is much higher, the same estimated 
coefficients would imply a pre-1986 ETI of 
0.42 versus a post-1986 ETI of 0.36. Kopczuk 
(2005) concludes that the results imply that 
an individual who has no access to any deduc-
tions would not respond to changes in tax 
rates (at least over a three-year interval). The 
more deductions are available, the stronger 
the response. This result is consistent with 
Gruber and Saez’s finding that the behavioral 
response is substantial for taxable income, 
but much smaller for broad income.70 
70 Another innovation to Gruber and Saez’s approach 
made by Kopczuk (2005) is the inclusion of separate 
 variables to control for mean reversion and secular diver-
gence in the income distribution.
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Giertz (2007) applies the methods of 
Gruber and Saez (2002) to larger panel 
data sets of tax returns from 1979 to 2001 
available only within government agencies 
(see appendix B.1). Using first the data 
from the Continuous Work History Survey 
which does not oversample higher income 
earners, he shows that Gruber and Saez’s 
approach yields an estimated ETI for the 
1990s of 0.20—or about half the size of 
the corresponding estimate for the 1980s. 
However, when he uses broad income, 
instead of taxable income, the estimated 
elasticity is 0.15, as opposed to 0.12 for the 
1980s. This significant difference between 
the taxable income estimates and small dif-
ference between the broad income esti-
mates is consistent with the results from 
Kopczuk (2005) suggesting that the avail-
ability of deductions and exemptions mat-
ter in determining the ETI because the 
fraction of taxpayers choosing to itemize 
was approximately 25 percent lower in 
1993 compared to 1986. Calculating the 
ETI over the period 1979 to 2001, Giertz 
obtains an estimate of 0.30.
This concludes our selective summary of 
what is known about the value of the ETI. Of 
note is that estimated values of the ETI for 
the 1990s, identified largely off of the 1990 
and 1993 tax changes, are generally lower 
than those for the 1980s, identified largely 
off of the 1981 and 1986 changes. There are 
two broad, and not mutually exclusive, cat-
egories of explanations for this pattern of 
results.
The first suggests there is no reason to 
expect a universal parameter in the first 
place. Leading proponents of this hypothesis 
are Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002), who argue 
that the ETI is not a structural parameter 
and is a function of not only preferences, 
but also the breadth of the tax base and tax 
 enforcement parameters. Kopczuk (2005) 
found empirical support for this hypothesis, 
and Giertz (2007) found that the elasticity 
with respect to taxable income varies much 
more by decade than the elasticity with 
respect to broad income, supporting the 
argument that changing rules for deductions 
affects the taxable income elasticity.
The second category of explanations 
points to methodological issues as the driv-
ing reason behind the differences between 
decades. One such argument proposed by 
Carroll (1998) and Giertz (2007), among oth-
ers, suggests that (for at least some periods) 
the model is unable to adequately control for 
exogenous income trends. As a result, the ris-
ing, and non-tax-related, income inequality 
trend could bias ETI estimates upward when 
top tax rates fall and downward when they 
rise. Another potential source of bias that 
varies across periods could arise if the mod-
els fail to capture some potentially important 
types of income shifting, such as the shift-
ing between the corporate and individual 
income tax base. Incentives for this type of 
shifting were greater in the 1980s than in the 
1990s.
Due to space limitations, we do not com-
prehensively review the substantial literature 
estimating the ETI using data from countries 
other than the United States.71 However, 
some recent work using Danish data is worth 
noting, largely because of the especially rich 
longitudinal data available to researchers 
that span over two decades and also include 
a variety of demographic  variables not 
 available on U.S. (or most other countries’) 
tax returns.
71 Although see the working paper version of our paper, 
Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2009), which does discuss this 
literature. We reiterate that, for reasons discussed earlier, 
there is no reason to expect that the ETI would be the same 
across countries because it is a function not only of argu-
ably relatively uniform aspects of preferences, but also of 
the details of countries’ tax systems. Slemrod and Kopczuk 
(2002) develop a model of the “optimal” elasticity of tax-
able income and show that it will be lower in countries with 
more egalitarian social welfare functions and with a lower 
cost of administering and enforcing a broad tax base.
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Kleven and Schultz (2011) use panel tax 
return data since 1980 to analyze behavioral 
responses to various income tax reforms over 
the period 1984 to 2005 in Denmark using a 
method similar to Gruber and Saez (2002). 
Their study has three key advantages rela-
tive to U.S.-based studies. First, they can use 
the full universe of Danish tax filers over a 
long period, generating a very large longi-
tudinal dataset that also contains detailed 
 socioeconomic information. Second, the 
Danish income distribution has been very 
stable over this period compared to the 
U.S. distribution, making tax effects easier 
to identify. Third, the Danish tax reforms 
spanning 1984–2005 generated substantial 
variation in tax rates that is not systematically 
correlated with income, as different reforms 
affected different brackets and consisted of 
both rate increases and decreases for a given 
bracket. Furthermore, many changes apply 
only to specific income components as the 
Danish tax system imposes different rates on 
different income components. As a result, 
they can control for a rich set of base-year 
incomes. They find that (1) population-wide 
elasticities are modest compared to most 
existing studies, (2) elasticities for capital 
income are larger than for labor income, (3) 
elasticities for negative income (deductions, 
negative capital income) are larger than for 
positive income, (4) elasticities for the self-
employed are larger than for employees, 
(5) elasticities are monotonically increasing 
in income level and are two to three times 
larger in the top quintile of the distribution 
than in the bottom quintile of the distribu-
tion, and (6) income effects are very small.
Chetty et al. (2011) also use population tax 
files from Denmark and estimate the ETI 
using bunching evidence around kink points 
where marginal tax rates jump, building upon 
the method developed in Saez (2010) in the 
U.S. case. They develop a new method of 
estimating the long-run elasticity in an envi-
ronment where adjustment costs  attenuate 
short-run behavioral responses by compar-
ing the short-run effects of small versus large 
tax changes. Consistent with the existence 
of large adjustment costs, the amount of 
bunching they obtain is a highly convex func-
tion of the size of the change in the net-of-tax 
rate at the kink. In other words, the implied 
elasticity is larger from large changes in 
marginal tax rates than for small changes in 
marginal tax rates. The degree of bunching 
varies across demographic groups and occu-
pations in a manner that appears to be cor-
related with the flexibility of labor supply 
and is much more pronounced for second-
ary earners and especially the self-employed. 
Their results suggest that adjustment fric-
tions create heterogeneity in the size of the 
elasticity response in the short-run and that 
such effects need to be taken into account to 
obtain the long-run elasticity that is of most 
interest for policy making.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 What We Have Learned
Under certain assumptions, which in 
the end we find unconvincing, all behav-
ioral responses to income tax rate changes 
are symptoms of inefficiency, and all such 
responses are captured by the elasticity 
of taxable income. This insight, raised in 
Feldstein (1995, 1999), is central to tax pol-
icy analysis. Because of its centrality to the 
evaluation of tax structure and because of 
the growing availability of longitudinal tax 
return data, much effort has been devoted to 
identifying its magnitude.
Attracting even more attention was the 
fact that the early empirical literature, focus-
ing on the U.S. tax cuts of 1981 and par-
ticularly 1986, produced elasticity estimates 
large enough to suggest that, not only was 
the marginal efficiency cost of tax rates high, 
but that the United States might be on the 
wrong side of the Laffer curve. Subsequent 
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research generated considerably lower esti-
mates, in part because of better data and 
improved methodology, but also because the 
variety of tax rate changes after 1986 facili-
tated separating out the impact of tax rate 
changes from non-tax-related changes in the 
inequality of pretax income. While there are 
no truly convincing estimates of the long-run 
elasticity, the best available estimates range 
from 0.12 to 0.40. Proceeding mechanically, 
at the approximate midpoint of this rate—an 
ETI of 0.25—the marginal excess burden 
per dollar of federal income tax revenue 
raised is $ 0.195 for an across-the-board 
proportional tax increase, and $ 0.339 for a 
tax increase focused on the top 1 percent of 
income earners.72 
Even at the top of this range the U.S. 
marginal top rate is far from the top of the 
Laffer curve. However, the elasticity of tax-
able income is higher than one would cal-
culate if the sole behavioral response were 
labor supply. There is also much evidence 
to suggest that the ETI is higher for high-
income individuals who have more access to 
avoidance opportunities, especially deduct-
ible expenses.
The main attraction of the ETI concept—
that it is a sufficient statistic for welfare anal-
ysis and therefore one need not inquire into 
the anatomy of behavioral response—has 
proven to be overstated for two important 
reasons.
First, the welfare relevance of the elastic-
ity depends on the extent of fiscal externali-
ties—whether taxable income is shifted to 
or from another tax base, or to and from the 
72 These calculations are based on 2005 tax return data; 
details are available from the authors. Note that the ETI 
for top earners could conceivably be higher than 0.25, 
especially if the top tax rate is increased while keeping the 
tax rate on realized capital gains constant hence fueling tax 
avoidance opportunities. With an elasticity of 0.5 for the 
top 1 percent income earners, the marginal excess burden 
per dollar of revenue doubles to $ 0.678 for a tax increase 
on top percentile income earners.
same tax base at a different time. Moreover, 
if classical externalities apply to often-
deductible items such as charitable contribu-
tions, the ETI must be adjusted for welfare 
purposes. Examining which components 
of taxable income respond to tax rates (the 
“anatomy” of response) can help clarify the 
extent of these externalities. This brings us 
back to the pre-ETI attention to each of the 
many margins of behavioral response to tax 
rate changes.
Second, while there is compelling U.S. 
evidence of strong behavioral responses to 
taxation at the upper end of the distribu-
tion around the main tax reform episodes 
since 1980, in all cases those responses fall 
in the first two tiers of the Slemrod (1990, 
1995) hierarchy—timing and avoidance. In 
contrast, there is no compelling evidence 
to date of real economic responses to tax 
rates (the bottom tier in Slemrod’s hierar-
chy) at the top of the income distribution. 
In the narrow perspective where the tax 
system is given (and abstracting from fis-
cal and classical externalities), the type of 
behavioral response is irrelevant. However, 
in the broader perspective where changes 
in the tax system such as broadening the tax 
base, eliminating avoidance opportunities, 
or strengthening enforcement are possible 
options, the type of behavioral response 
becomes crucial. While such policy options 
may have little impact on real responses 
to tax rates (such as labor supply or saving 
behavior), they can have a major impact on 
responses to tax rates along the avoidance or 
evasion channels. In other words, if behav-
ioral responses to taxation are large in the 
current tax system, the best policy response 
would not be to lower tax rates, but instead 
to broaden the tax base and eliminate avoid-
ance opportunities to lower the size of 
behavioral responses. Those findings also 
highlight the importance of the fact that the 
ETI is not an immutable parameter, but can 
be influenced by government policies. For 
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this reason, it is likely to vary across coun-
tries and within countries over time when 
non-rate aspects of tax systems change.
The empirical methods are most convinc-
ing in estimating the short-term response to 
tax rate changes, and in that case one must 
be careful to distinguish the response to 
anticipated versus unanticipated changes. 
Estimates of the elasticity of taxable income 
in the long run (i.e., exceeding a few years) 
are plagued by extremely difficult issues of 
identification, so difficult that we believe that 
there are no convincing estimates of the long-
run elasticity of reported taxable income to 
changes in the marginal tax rate.73 Analysis 
of panel data does not seem likely to resolve 
the identification issues raised by trends in 
income inequality and mean reversion at the 
top and bottom ends of the income distribu-
tion. Repeated cross-section analysis based 
on longer time series is very useful to analyze 
changes in the share of income accruing to 
various income groups and to assess whether 
those changes are systematically related to 
changes in marginal tax rates. However, evi-
dence from a single country is in general not 
enough to conclusively estimate behavioral 
elasticities because many factors besides tax 
rate shape the income distribution. Time-
series share analysis, coupled with com-
positional analysis, can be useful to detect 
large short-term changes due to behavioral 
responses.
5.2 What We Need to Learn
First, future research that attempts to 
quantify the welfare cost of higher tax rates 
should attempt to measure the components 
of behavioral responses as well as their sum. 
It needs to be more attentive to the extent 
to which the behavioral response reflects 
 shifting to other bases and the extent to 
73  Many of these problems are not unique to identifying 
the long-run ETI, but apply to the estimation of all behav-
ioral responses.
which the behavioral response comes from 
margins with substantial externalities.
Second, empirical analyses should look 
more systematically at non-U.S. experi-
ence to potentially validate the conclusions 
based on U.S. experience and to sharpen our 
understanding of how the environment, writ 
large, affects the ETI. As discussed above, 
this line of research is already under way 
and indeed the most promising and inno-
vative recent studies on the ETI have been 
based on non-U.S. data. Part of the reason 
is that several OECD countries, especially 
in Scandinavia, are now making individual-
level tax data, often linked with demographic 
information, much more widely available for 
research purposes than is the United States. 
This trend is likely to continue unless the 
United States broadens access to population 
tax return data.
Third, researchers should be seeking bet-
ter sources of identification; for example, 
parallel income tax systems that differen-
tially affect taxpayers over a long period of 
time. Conceivably, field experiments could 
be designed where individuals are randomly 
assigned to different tax schedules in the 
spirit of the older negative income tax exper-
iments in the United States.74 
Fourth, researchers should be sensitive 
to the possibility that nonstandard aspects 
of tax systems and the behavioral response 
to them—such as salience, information, 
popular support, and asymmetric response 
to increases versus decreases—might affect 
the size of behavioral response. The recent 
approach of Chetty (2009a) is particularly 
promising. His meta-analysis, which includes 
most ETI studies, shows that  discrepancies 
across estimates could be explained by 
imperfect optimization and frictions such as 
adjustment costs. In that context, large and 
salient changes in tax rates provide much 
74 See Munnell (1987).
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more informative estimates of the long-run 
ETI than small or non-salient changes.
Finally and related, the ETI literature 
could be fruitfully connected to the macro-
economic literature along two dimensions. 
First, a number of recent macroeconomic 
studies have estimated the effects of taxes 
on labor supply using cross-country analysis. 
Instead of considering only aggregate labor 
supply, it could be possible to carry out an 
analysis by income groups to sharpen the 
identification and capture a broader set of 
behavioral responses. Second, as we have 
pointed out, tax rates can have long-term 
effects on reported capital incomes through 
saving and wealth accumulation chan-
nels. Estimating such effects would natu-
rally require the development of a dynamic 
framework as in the macroeconomic savings 
literature.
Appendix
A. Recent Legislated Tax Changes 
in the United States
In this appendix section, we briefly out-
line the major changes in the U.S. individual 
income tax since the mid 1950s. Table A1 
reports the top statutory marginal federal 
income tax rates on (1) ordinary individual 
income, (2) earned income, (3) long-term 
realized capital gains, as well as the corporate 
tax rate since 1952. The table also describes 
briefly the most important additional provi-
sions affecting high-income tax rates.
Although Congress regularly amends the 
tax code, only occasionally does it make 
major reforms. The 1954 Internal Revenue 
Code represented an important and funda-
mental reform to the U.S. tax system. The 
1954 Code created twenty-four tax  brackets 
with marginal tax rates increasing with 
income from 20 to 91 percent, but with a 
maximum tax rate of 25 percent applied to 
capital gains; the top corporate tax rate was 
52 percent. (While the 1954 act represented 
a fundamental change to the U.S. tax sys-
tem, it did not alter MTRs on top incomes.) 
The 1954 Code was amended many times, 
but remained in place until 1986. The 1960s 
saw a couple of important tax changes. One 
was the Revenue Act of 1964, inspired by 
President John Kennedy, but enacted under 
President Lyndon Johnson. This act reduced 
individual and corporate tax rates, notably 
lowering the top marginal income tax rate 
from 91 percent to 70 percent. The Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 introduced a new rate 
schedule. While the top individual income 
tax rate remained at 70 percent, the top rate 
on earned income was lowered (over the 
next few years) to 50 percent.75 The 1970s 
saw federal tax revenues (and effective mar-
ginal tax rates) increase as a result of “bracket 
creep” brought on by the combination of 
unusually high inflation and tax brackets not 
indexed for inflation. In response to this, a 
series of tax acts were passed, most of which 
lowered tax revenues by increasing allowable 
tax deductions and credits.
Congress has changed federal marginal tax 
rates several times since 1980. The Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 reduced the top 
rate from 70 percent to 50 percent, and low-
ered all other tax rates in three annual steps 
by a total of about 23 percent (not 23 per-
centage points). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
represented the most comprehensive tax 
reform since 1954. It dropped the top mar-
ginal tax rate to 28 percent in two steps from 
1986 to 1988, and made smaller cuts across 
the income distribution. The Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 also eliminated the exclusion of 
60 percent of long-term capital gains, low-
ered the corporate tax rate from 46 percent 
to 34 percent, and contained scores of other 
75  The 1969 act also extended a 5 percent income tax 
surcharge. Additionally, it established both the individual 
and corporate Alternative Minimum Tax.
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 provisions several of which reduced deduc-
tions and tax sheltering opportunities.
The tax changes of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993 were 
smaller and more focused on high-income 
filers than those of the 1980s. The 1990 tax 
change increased the top tax rate from 28 
to 31 percent. The 1993 tax change further 
increased the top rate from 31 to 36 percent 
and applied this rate to individuals with lower 
incomes. It also created a new top marginal 
tax rate of 39.6 percent by legislating a 10 per-
cent surtax. Top tax rates on earned income 
increased by roughly another 2.9 percentage 
points because the cap on income subject to 
the Medicare portion of the payroll tax was 
lifted. Unlike the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
the 1990 and 1993 tax changes incorporated 
TABLE A1 
Top Federal Marginal Tax Rates 
Ordinary income Earned income Capital gains Corporate income
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
1952–1963 91.0 91.0 25.0 52
1964 77.0 77.0 25.0 50
1965–1967 70.0 70.0 25.0 48
1968 75.3 75.3 26.9 53
1969 77.0 77.0 27.9 53
1970 71.8 71.8 32.3 49
1971 70.0 60.0 34.3 48
1972–1975 70.0 50.0 36.5 48
1976–1978 70.0 50.0 39.9 48
1979–1980 70.0 50.0 28.0 46
1981 68.8 50.0 23.7 46
1982–1986 50.0 50.0 20.0 46
1987 38.5 38.5 28.0 40
1988–1990 28.0 28.0 28.0 34
1991–1992 31.0 31.0 28.0 34
1993 39.6 39.6 28.0 35
1994–1996 39.6 42.5 28.0 35
1997–2000 39.6 42.5 20.0 35
2001 39.1 42.0 20.0 35
2002 38.6 41.5 20.0 35
2003–2009 35.0 37.9 15.0 35
Notes: MTRs apply to top incomes. In some instances, lower income taxpayers may face higher MTRs because of 
income caps on payroll taxes or the so-called 33 percent “bubble” bracket following TRA 86. From 1952 to 1962, a 
87 percent maximum average tax rate provision made the top marginal tax rate 87 percent instead of 91 percent for 
many very top income earners. From 1968 to 1970, rates include surtaxes. For earned income, MTRs include the 
Health Insurance portion of the payroll tax beginning with year 1994. Rates exclude the effect of phaseouts, which 
effectively raise top MTRs for many high-income filers. MTRs on realized “long-term” capital gains are adjusted to 
reflect that, for some years, a fraction of realized gains were excluded from taxation. Since 2003, dividends are also 
tax favored with a maximum tax rate of 15 percent.
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only very few additional changes to the tax 
code. Also in the 1990s, the Taxpayer Relief 
Act of 1997 substantially lowered capital 
gains tax rates, among other things. This act 
did not change tax rates on earned income 
other than capital gains.
Tax rates have also changed since 2000. 
In 2001, the Economic Growth Tax Relief 
and Reconciliation Act lowered marginal tax 
rates, reduced the number of tax brackets 
and expanded allowable credits and deduc-
tions. Different aspects of the 2001 tax 
change were scheduled to phase in over a 
number of years, with the act expiring com-
pletely in 2011. In 2003, the Jobs Growth 
Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act acceler-
ated all of the marginal rate cuts from the 
2001 tax change that were not set to fully 
phase-in until 2006. Additionally, it sub-
stantially lowered tax rates on capital gains 
and dividends down to 15 percent. These 
changes will also expire in 2011, absent 
action by Congress.
Before proceeding, note that, as a practical 
matter, a number of studies in the empirical 
literature (as well as the empirical exercise 
in section 3) examine adjusted gross income 
(AGI) in place of taxable income. Taxable 
income equals AGI minus the value of per-
sonal exemptions and either the standard or 
itemized deductions. Many data sets do not 
include enough information to calculate tax-
able income in a consistent way over many 
years. This is especially true for data sets span-
ning many decades, over which the defini-
tion of taxable income changes substantially. 
Creating a constant-law income measure (see 
the previous section) often requires informa-
tion that is not reported, and therefore not 
available to researchers, in many years. Many 
taxable income responses are also captured 
in AGI; however, changes in itemized deduc-
tions are not observed. Also, recall from 
section 2 that the potential for positive exter-
nalities associated with some itemized deduc-
tions could argue for  examining responses to 
AGI—even when good measures of taxable 
income are available.
B. Tax Return Data
As discussed in the paper, the estimation 
of behavioral responses of reported income 
to tax changes relies critically on the avail-
ability of high-quality individual income tax 
data. In this appendix section, we discuss 
briefly data availability in the United States 
and we describe in more detail the data we 
used in section 3.4.
B.1 U.S. Tax Return Data
The Statistics of Income (SOI) division at 
the Internal Revenue Service has created 
large annual micro-datasets of individual tax 
returns since 1960. The SOI data are strati-
fied random samples of about 250,000 tax 
returns and include most of the informa-
tion reported on the filers’ tax returns, plus 
some additional demographic information. 
Sampling rates vary by income (and other tax 
return characteristics). The SOI heavily over 
samples high-income filers with 100 percent 
sampling rates at the top of the distribution, 
a key advantage as top incomes play a criti-
cal role in determining overall responses to 
changes in tax rates.
Sampling into the SOI data is based on (a 
random transformation of) Social Security 
numbers of tax filers. These assigned num-
bers do not change from year to year, and 
beginning with year 1979, enable research-
ers to link SOI annual cross sections into a 
panel dataset. (For more detail on the SOI 
data and the SOI’s sampling strategy, see the 
discussion below on the data used in section 
3.) In particular, a core set of five last four 
digits of the Social Security numbers are 
always sampled and hence are a pure lon-
gitudinal sample of 0.05 percent of U.S. tax 
returns. This core longitudinal sample within 
the SOI data is called the Continuous Work 
History Sample (CWHS).
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In several cases, SOI has supplemented 
the core SOI cross sections by creating 
additional panel data drawing from the full 
population of individual tax returns. One 
such example is the Treasury’s Family Panel, 
which is a stratified random sample of tax fil-
ers followed from 1987 to 1996. The Family 
Panel begins with 88,000 tax returns in 1987, 
follows filers and their dependents through 
1996 and includes “refreshments” to remain 
representative of the overall filing popula-
tion. Treasury’s 1999 Edited Panel, which 
begins in 1999, is designed similarly to the 
Family Panel. It currently runs through 
2005. Another example is the Sales of Capital 
Assets Panel, which follows a sample of tax 
filers reporting sales of capital assets (on 
Schedule D of IRS Form 1040).
SOI has released to the public the so-
called “Public Use File” (PUF) version of 
the SOI annual cross sections. To protect the 
identity of taxpayers, those public use files 
have a lower sampling rate at the very top 
(1/3 instead of 1) and they also blur some 
variables for very high incomes by combin-
ing several tax returns together. The PUF 
contain about 100,000 tax returns per year. 
However, the PUF do not contain longitu-
dinal identifiers and hence cannot be linked 
into panel data. Another important limita-
tion of the PUF is that they do not report 
separately income items of each spouse in 
the case of married joint filers, limiting the 
ability to measure the important secondary 
earner response to tax changes.76 
A public-use version of the CWHS 
was also made public for years 1979 to 
1990. The public version of the panel also 
included some “blurring” of information 
to protect the identity of taxpayers. The 
public-use  version of the CWHS goes by 
various names, including the “University of 
76 The SOI files can be merged within SOI to individ-
ual wage income information to obtain the breakdown of 
income by spouse.
Michigan Tax Panel” or “NBER Tax Panel.” 
The absence of publicly available U.S. 
panel data since 1990 has severely limited 
the ability of academic researchers to study 
more recent tax changes. As a result, most 
of the recent studies have been carried out 
by researchers within government agencies 
(in a few cases in collaboration with outside 
academics).
Due to improvements in information tech-
nology, it has now become feasible for SOI 
to use the complete population files of tax 
returns, i.e., about 140 million tax returns 
each year. Those samples can of course be 
linked longitudinally. The extremely large 
size of the population files could be used to 
broaden the scope of tax changes that can be 
analyzed. Indeed, the United States offers 
very rich variation at the state level. Most 
existing data samples are too small to analyze 
convincingly local changes. The availability 
of population files for research use could 
spur new work on responses to tax changes. 
B.2 Tax Return Data Used in Section 3
The panel of individual tax returns used in 
section 3 are from the Statistics of Income 
(SOI) and spans years 1991 to 1997. Marginal 
tax rates are imputed using Congressional 
Budget Office’s federal tax model. Income, 
denoted  z it , is a constant-law measure of 
AGI (adjusted gross income for individual i 
at time t), excluding capital gains and includ-
ing all Social Security benefits, such that 
z it = reportedAGI − realizedCG + nontax-
ableSSbenefits + deductedmovingexpenses. 
Dollar values are adjusted by the IRS’s 
inflation adjustment factors, using 1991 as 
the base. Marginal tax rates are imputed 
for only the federal income tax using the 
Congressional Budget Office’s internal tax 
calculators. The rate imputations exclude 
changes to the payroll tax (which only applies 
to earned income) and to changes to state tax 
rates. While this leaves an incomplete mea-
sure of the marginal tax rate, it has the  virtue 
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of simplicity. Because of the  stratification 
structure of the SOI panel, (paired) obser-
vations are weighted by the reciprocal of 
their probability of appearing in the sample 
as done by Auten and Carroll (1999) and by 
subsequent researchers working with the 
SOI panel.
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